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URBAN COMMONS AS PROPERTY 
EXPERIMENT: MAPPING CHICAGO’S FARMS 
AND GARDENS 
Nate Ela* 
ABSTRACT 
Over the past decade, scholars of law and geography have been foraging 
in America’s cities, hunting for the commons.  Along the way, a new 
common sense has cropped up, which takes urban farms and community 
gardens as prototypical examples of the urban commons.  Farm fields and 
garden plots produce not only vegetables, the argument goes, but also 
opportunities for residents to access and use land as a shared, decommodified 
resource.  As both social practice and emergent institutional reality, such 
urban commons challenge and are challenged by the logics of public and 
private property that dominate our cities’ legal landscapes. 
This Article, rather than assuming that urban farms and gardens are 
examples of the urban commons, poses this as a question.  Are they in fact 
cases of commons governance?  And if so, how do people bring this about? 
I explore these questions from the ground up, through a socio-legal mapping 
of how people have gained access to and sought to govern land for a 
community garden and an urban farm in two neighborhoods on Chicago’s 
South Side.  This mapping suggests that we should conceive of urban farms 
and gardens as sites where people experiment with the rules, norms, and 
forms of property that govern urban land.  Municipal policies can promote 
property experiments that seek to treat urban land as a shared community 
resource. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decade, scholars of law and geography have been foraging 
in America’s cities, hunting for the commons.  In the process, a new common 
sense has cropped up, which takes urban farms and community gardens as 
prototypical examples of the urban commons.1  Farm fields and garden plots 
produce not only vegetables, the argument goes, but also opportunities for 
residents to “reclaim the commons” by accessing and using land as a shared, 
decommodified resource.2  As both social practice and emergent institutional 
                                                                                                             
 1. See, e.g., DAVID HARVEY, REBEL CITIES: FROM THE RIGHT TO THE CITY TO THE URBAN 
REVOLUTION 74 (2012); Nathan McClintock & Jenny Cooper, Cultivating the Commons: An 
Assessment of the Potential for Urban Agriculture on Oakland’s Public Land, UNIV. OF CAL. 
DEP’T OF GEOGRAPHY 1 (Dec. 2010), 
https://www.academia.edu/1226070/Cultivating_the_commons_An_assessment_of_the_pot
ential_for_urban_agriculture_on_Oaklands_public_land [https://perma.cc/VEE6-VUWX] 
(providing an “inventory of open space with potential for agricultural production . . . within 
the city limits of Oakland, California,” and to “locate Oakland’s ‘commons’”); Sheila R. 
Foster, Collective Action and the Urban Commons, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 57, 93–96 
(2011). 
 2. Nathan McClintock, Radical, Reformist, and Garden-Variety Neoliberal: Coming to 
Terms with Urban Agriculture’s Contradictions, 19 LOCAL ENV’T 147, 154 (2014). 
2016] URBAN COMMONS AS PROPERTY EXPERIMENT 249 
reality, such urban commons challenge and are challenged by the dichotomy 
of public and private property that dominate our cities’ legal landscapes.3 
But are urban farms and community gardens actually examples of the 
commons?  And if commons governance is indeed emerging in the fields of 
urban agriculture, how is that happening?  These questions are often 
bracketed, with farms and gardens assumed, without much investigation, to 
be instances of commons governance, which comes about through “self-
organization.”4  Instead of relying on local government to bring about the 
commons by ordinance, urban farmers and gardeners are said to be “self-
organizing” the rules of the urban commons.5 
In practice, what does governance in urban farms and gardens look like?  
Should we understand the rules and norms crafted by urban gardeners and 
farmers as commons governance, and the result of self-organization? Does 
that leave out important ways in which their socio-legal settings are not 
governed as commons, and are the product of rules that urban growers take, 
rather than those they make?  A better understanding of these questions could 
help people think about and advocate for policies that promote shared access 
to urban land and other resources.  This Article takes urban agriculture as a 
key case of how people may be bringing about an urban commons, and 
investigates the socio-legal processes by which urban gardeners, farmers, 
and their policy allies may be bringing an urban commons—or some other 
forms of governance—into being. 
I draw on over four years of ethnographic research with farmers, 
gardeners, and urban agriculture policymakers in Chicago, Illinois.  From 
2011 through 2015, I observed how farmers, gardeners, and their allies tried 
to increase access to affordable land, and how they worked to govern and 
use such land when it was made available.  From time to time, I partnered 
with the Chicago Food Policy Action Council in projects to identify new 
                                                                                                             
 3. See, e.g., Nicholas Blomley, Un-Real Estate: Proprietary Space and Public 
Gardening, 36 ANTIPODE 614, 631–32 (2004). 
 4. Urban ecologists Johan Colding and Stephan Barthel have noted this tendency among 
writers on community gardens. Johan Colding & Stephan Barthel, The Potential of ‘Urban 
Green Commons’ in the Resilience Building of Cities, 86 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 156, 161 (2013) 
(observing “a notable difference to what degree [urban green commons] can be viewed as 
self-organized stewardship systems”); see also Marianne E. Krasny & Keith G. Tidball, 
Community Gardens as Contexts for Science, Stewardship, and Civic Action Learning, 2 
CITIES AND THE ENV’T 1, 6 (2009), 
http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1037&context=cate 
[https://perma.cc/V7M5-3UEY] (arguing that community gardens have “a tradition of self-
organization”). 
 5. See, e.g., Foster, supra note 1, 94 (“The transformation of these small spaces into 
productive land uses—community gardens—is a largely endogenous effort.  Local residents 
manage to come together, construct and maintain these fully functioning gardens in the 
absence of government coercion or intervention, or the divestment of property rights in the 
lots/gardens.”). 
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parcels of land that could be used for urban agriculture and to explore new 
means of arranging land tenure for such parcels.6  I also had opportunities to 
learn about the process of land acquisition through research into the internal 
archives of an urban farming organization7 and dozens of interviews with 
farmers, gardeners, city officials, and urban planners. 
My research suggests that with a ground-up explanation of how urban 
growers participate in bringing about new forms of governance—which 
some have proposed thinking of as an urban commons—it is best to set aside, 
at least temporarily, concepts of “the commons” and “self-organization.”  
Growers in Chicago seldom speak in those terms.  To be sure, they and their 
allies in and out of city government are keen to devise ways for people to 
access and use land as a shared, productive resource.  But the rules, forms, 
and norms they are tinkering with—from zoning laws and land trusts8 to 
landscaping regulations and lines from Leviticus9—are not what we usually 
associate with the commons. 
In this Article, I explore how we might understand the governance of land 
for urban agriculture more realistically, as the fruit of a wide range of legal 
experiments that urban growers and their allies have pursued in efforts to 
expand urban food production.  In Part I, I review how scholars of the 
regulation of urban space have theorized urban farms and gardens as sites of 
the urban commons.  I then propose a method of socio-legal mapping to 
understand how the property experiments underway in such places might—
or might not—be understood in terms of the commons and self-organization. 
In Part II, I undertake such a socio-legal mapping, examining how the 
terms of land use and access for farming and gardening have been shaped by 
a wide range of laws, regulations, rules, and norms related to property.  Two 
sites serve as case studies for this mapping exercise.  The Kumunda 
community garden in Chicago’s Woodlawn neighborhood illustrates how 
land access and use for urban gardens involves not only self-organized 
garden rules that prioritize use and sharing, but also rules concerning the tax 
status of nonprofits, municipal prohibitions on uncut grass, land deals 
                                                                                                             
 6. See, e.g., Erika Allen & Nate Ela, Cultivating Productive Landscapes: A Vision for 
Community Based Urban Food Systems in the Millennium Reserve, ILL. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., 
COASTAL MGMT. PROGRAM (Aug. 2015), http://chicagofoodpolicy.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/Cultivating-Productive-Landscapes-December-2015.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/22VJ-PMQS]; see also Urban Farmland Working Group, CHI. FOOD POL’Y 
ACTION COUNCIL, http://chicagofoodpolicy.com/policy-initiatives/ [https://perma.cc/6ZRL-
BNGS]. 
 7. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 8. See infra Part II.B. 
 9. See infra Part II.A.5. 
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negotiated with powerful neighborhood institutions, gleaning programs 
inspired by the Torah, and state and local composting regulations.10 
At the Growing Home urban farm in Englewood, people transitioning out 
of homelessness and incarceration can gain job skills.  The farm sits on two 
pieces of land, one acquired through a transfer from the city, and another 
held in trust by NeighborSpace, Chicago’s urban agriculture land trust.11  
Understanding how Growing Home provides shared access to and benefits 
from its land requires tracing how it emerged from experimentation with a 
federal statute governing disposition of surplus federal property, and an 
effort to reinterpret NeighborSpace’s mission to include commercial sites.  I 
also describe how Growing Home has helped spur conversations around how 
land might be held in trust for for-profit farms. 
I conclude by arguing that socio-legal scholars looking for sites of the 
urban commons should focus on the property experiments carried out by 
urban growers as they claim access to vacant land, and govern it as a shared 
community resource.  A socio-legal mapping of such experiments reveals 
that growers and their allies may be self-organizing certain rules for 
governing land for gardens and farms, but do so in relation to rules created 
by state and local government and by reference to core elements of private 
property.  The claim, then, is neither that the Chicago cases examined here 
represent an “urban commons,” nor that they are typical of how people 
elsewhere govern land that residents may use as a shared resource.  Rather, 
they point us in the direction of a more grounded, realistic approach to 
understanding how people bring about and attempt to institutionalize 
alternative modes of governing urban land.  This perspective could help craft 
public policies that encourage the collective management of land and other 
community resources. 
I.  HUNTING THE URBAN COMMONS 
Until relatively recently, the vast majority of research on common 
property resources and commons governance overlooked the urban 
commons.12  But over the past decade, urban scholars across a wide range of 
disciplines have grown interested in the commons as a category of analysis, 
an institution, and a social practice.  As scholars have gone on the hunt for 
the urban commons, they have found it in a wide range of settings, from 
                                                                                                             
 10. See infra Part II.A. 
 11. See infra Part II.B. 
 12. Legal Geographer Nicholas Blomley calculated that as of late 2005 “the Digital 
Library of the Commons, held by the influential International Association for the Study of 
Common Property, reveals that only 21 of the available papers on common property (1.2%) 
concerned the ‘urban commons.’” Nicholas Blomley, Enclosure, Common Right and the 
Property of the Poor, 17 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 311, 318 (2008). 
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neighborhood orderliness13 to abandoned department stores,14 sidewalks15 to 
dog parks,16 public spaces17 to limited equity housing cooperatives.18  
Excitement for the urban commons among planners has produced 
competitions to bring the concept to new spaces.19  Some scholars have 
suggested that the city itself is a commons, and ought to be governed as 
such.20  
A. The Commons in the Garden 
One of the most frequently cited examples of the urban commons, 
however, is the community garden.21  Legal scholars and social scientists 
have made a wide range of claims about what community gardens, taken as 
the prototypical example of the urban commons, make possible.  Some, like 
geographer Nathan McClintock, take gardens and urban agriculture as a way 
to produce food in a manner that is cooperative or collective.22  For David 
Harvey, what is more interesting is how gardens are an example of what he 
                                                                                                             
 13. See, e.g., Daniel Tumminelli O’Brien, Managing the Urban Commons: The Relative 
Influence of Individual and Social Incentives on the Treatment of Public Space, 23 HUM. 
NATURE 467 (2012) (evaluating specific patterns of the urban commons via comparing 
physical and social disorder). 
 14. See Blomley, supra note 12, at 312. 
 15. See Nicholas Blomley, How to Turn a Beggar into a Bus Stop: Law, Traffic and the 
‘Function of the Place’, 44 URB. STUD. 1697, 1705 (2007). 
 16. See Daniel Matisoff & Douglas Noonan, Managing Contested Greenspace: 
Neighborhood Commons and the Rise of Dog Parks, 6 INT’L J. OF THE COMMONS 28, 
https://www.thecommonsjournal.org/articles/10.18352/ijc.299/ [https://perma.cc/B42N-
KTPS]. 
 17. See Ash Amin, Collective Culture and Urban Public Space, 12 CITY 5, 6 (2008). 
 18. See Amanda Huron, The Work of the Urban Commons: Limited-Equity Cooperatives 
in Washington, D.C. (2012) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, City University of New York) 
(on file with author). 
 19. See DESIGNING THE URBAN COMMONS, http://designingtheurbancommons.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/4H8L-FT2J] (“Re-imagining spaces in London as places for collaboration, 
sharing, and collective ownership.  A competition inspired by the rights to the commons.”). 
 20. See Michael Hardt & Antonio Negri, COMMONWEALTH, 153–54 (2009); Sheila R. 
Foster & Christian Iaione, The City as a Commons, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 281 (2016). 
 21. See, e.g., U.S. FOREST SERVICE, NORTHERN RESEARCH STATION, RESTORATIVE 
COMMONS: CREATING HEALTH AND WELL-BEING THROUGH URBAN LANDSCAPES 185 (Lindsay 
Campbell & Anne Wiesen, eds., 2009) [hereinafter RESTORATIVE COMMONS]; Efrat 
Eizenberg, Actually Existing Commons: Three Moments of Space of Community Gardens in 
New York City, 44 ANTIPODE 764 (2011); Foster, supra note 1, at 93–97; HARVEY, supra note 
1, at 74; McClintock & Cooper, supra note 1, at 10. See generally Laura Lawson & Abbilyn 
Miller, Community Gardens and Urban Agriculture as Antithesis to Abandonment: Exploring 
a Citizenship-Land Model, in THE CITY AFTER ABANDONMENT, 17–40 (Margaret Dewar and 
June Manning Thomas, eds. 2013); Colding & Barthel, supra note 4, at 159, 160; Johan 
Colding et al., Urban Green Commons: Insights on Urban Common Property Systems, 23 
GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 1039, 1041 (2013); McClintock, supra note 2. 
 22. See McClintock & Cooper, supra note 1, at 1. 
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calls a “social practice of commoning,” which decommodifies both the land 
and its products.23  Others focus on what the garden commons produce other 
than just food, such as new neighborhood social norms,24 public health,25 or 
urban resilience.26  Other authors focus less on what the garden commons 
makes possible than on how it is routinely threatened by development.27  This 
has led some to suggest policies that could protect the urban commons by 
protecting urban gardens.  Legal scholar Sheila Foster, for example, proposes 
that courts recognize a limited property right in urban gardens so as to 
support injunctions that would bar the city from taking public land if the 
public value accruing from the gardens would be irreparably harmed and 
such harm is not outweighed by competing land uses.28 
Relatively less has been said about how urban commons emerge or how 
people strategize and act to bring them about.  To the extent scholars have 
paid attention to the emergence of the commons in a garden setting, they 
have focused on whether community gardens are endogenously organized.  
Foster, for example, argues that gardens are organized largely without 
governmental support.29  Indeed, it is not uncommon for studies of 
community gardens to highlight how government actors are antagonists.30 
There are good reasons why scholars have been drawn by the promise of 
community gardens as a case of endogenous, self-organized management of 
land.  The urban commons in general, and community gardens in particular, 
seem to offer a third way of managing urban land—an alternative to market 
allocation and public ownership.  This not only offers an exciting opportunity 
                                                                                                             
 23. HARVEY, supra note 1, at 73.  Harvey, like other commons activists, picks up on the 
suggestion made by historian Peter Linebaugh that we think of the commons as a process—
commoning—rather than simply as a static institution. See PETER LINEBAUGH, THE MAGNA 
CARTA MANIFESTO: LIBERTIES AND COMMONS FOR ALL 279 (2008) (“To speak of the 
commons as if it were a natural resource is misleading at best and dangerous at worst—the 
commons is an activity . . . .”). 
 24. Foster, supra note 1, at 95 (“[Gardeners] . . . become norm-entrepreneurs.  Their 
actions transform not just the physical space but also the norms and behavior that govern that 
space.”). 
 25. See generally RESTORATIVE COMMONS, supra note 21. 
 26. See generally Colding & Barthel, supra note 4. 
 27. See Eizenberg, supra note 21, at 777. 
 28. See Sheila Foster, The City as an Ecological Space: Social Capital and Urban Land 
Use, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 527, 575 (2006). 
 29. See Foster, supra note 1, at 94. 
 30. Government actors are often understood as enemies of the garden commons, clapping 
developers on the back as they fire up their bulldozers to level a garden on a vacant lot.  This, 
of course, is part of the dynamic of how urban land use is transformed, and the story of Mayor 
Rudolph Giuliani’s opposition to vacant lot gardens in New York City has come to be 
legendary in the literature. See, e.g., Lynn A. Staeheli, Don Mitchell & Kristina Gibson, 
Conflicting Rights to the City in New York’s Community Gardens, 58 GEOJOURNAL 197, 200–
01 (2002). 
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to highlight actually-existing alternative forms of resource management,31 
but it also offers fertile urban soil in which the theoretical ideas developed 
by Elinor Ostrom might take root.32 
Yet while gardeners may indeed self-organize in the sense that the rules 
that guide how they garden are not given directly by state agencies, it would 
be incorrect to think that community gardens or urban farms are wholly 
disconnected from rules enforced by the state—or, for that matter, from core 
elements of private property.  Support from the government may not come 
in the form of rules or even grants of land or money (though it often does).  
But everything from local ordinances to federal statutes creates affordances 
that enable community gardens to be organized. 
This Article seeks to make these connections apparent.  It maps the wide 
variety of rules and norms that provide urban growers opportunities to claim 
and govern land as a shared, community resource.  In so doing, it examines 
what a focus on endogeneity and self-organization—central concepts in 
studies of commons governance—might overlook.  How might people bring 
about an urban commons not only through self-organization, but also by 
contesting, leveraging, and adapting rules made possible thanks to local laws 
and the norms of private property?  The answer to this question requires a 
richer sense of the rules, norms, and practices at play in the fields of the city. 
B. Socio-Legal Mapping 
The aim of this Article is to sketch a map of the rules and relationships at 
stake as people bring about shared uses for land on the South Side of 
Chicago.  I develop this map through case studies of a community garden 
and an urban farm.  Rather than a geographical mapping of urban farms and 
gardens, to understand where they are,33 the exercise is one of socio-legal 
mapping, focused on tracing the relationships of power and governance at 
stake in the legal landscape of the city. 
Several different methods inform this strategy of socio-legal mapping.  
One, power mapping, is an analytical tool familiar to organizers for social 
change.  This form of mapping traces relations of power in order to identify 
                                                                                                             
 31. Eizenberg, supra note 21, at 766. 
 32. See generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF 
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990) (elaborating a theory of why and how voluntary 
organizations can solve collective action dilemmas in governing common pool resources, and 
providing examples of communal governance of meadows, forests, water rights, and 
fisheries). 
 33. This is a worthy, and remarkably challenging, project taken on by other scholars. See, 
e.g., John R. Taylor & Sarah Taylor Lovell, Mapping Public and Private Spaces of Urban 
Agriculture in Chicago Through the Analysis of High-Resolution Aerial Images in Google 
Earth, 108 LANDSCAPE & URB. PLAN. 57 (2012). 
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pressure points by which organizers might influence those relations.34  
Participatory mapping, meanwhile, is a technique conceived of and 
frequently deployed by development professionals, which solicits 
participants’ opinions on features relevant to their environments.35  Here, the 
goal is to understand power, and to do so through participation and 
interaction with people who experience it in their day-to-day routines—in 
this case, of gaining access to and managing urban land.  The results may 
contribute to identifying pressure points for social change, but may also be 
aimed at clarifying and changing conceptions of what social practices and 
relations are in play in a particular social setting. 
As such, socio-legal mapping is a ground-up method, which takes the 
daily practices and strategies of actors as the basis for understanding the 
institutions of power in play in a field of social action, rather than assuming 
certain institutions—such as the commons—will necessarily appear because 
that is what a theory predicts.  In this sense, it is influenced strongly by 
institutional ethnography, an approach developed by the sociologist Dorothy 
Smith.36  To understand the structured social relations that shape how people 
work in a particular setting, Smith proposed that the “mapping of social 
relations” begin at one research site and expand from there, “so that the larger 
organization that enters into and shapes it becomes visible.”37 
The inspiration to pay special attention to legal rules and power relations 
in such a mapping exercise draws on law professor David Kennedy’s recent 
thinking and writing on cartographic methods for understanding struggle and 
expertise in global governance.38  Kennedy, like Smith, focuses his analysis 
on how people at particular sites pursue projects.  As Kennedy observes, this 
is simply the social scientist adopting a method similar to that used by people 
figuring out how to make their way in a particular social setting: the first step 
toward strategic action is often to trace the nodes and relations of power that 
                                                                                                             
 34. See, e.g., Eva Schiffer, The Power Mapping Tool: A Method for the Empirical 
Research of Power Relations, INT’L FOOD POL’Y RES. INST. 19 (2007), 
http://ebrary.ifpri.org/cdm/ref/collection/p15738coll2/id/38994 [https://perma.cc/L7XX-
BBEU]. 
 35. See Jon Corbett, Good Practices in Participatory Mapping, INT’L FUND FOR AGRIC. 
DEV. 7 (2009), http://www.ifad.org/pub/map/pm_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/XG5J-G552]. 
 36. See generally DOROTHY E. SMITH, INSTITUTIONAL ETHNOGRAPHY: A SOCIOLOGY FOR 
PEOPLE 51 (2005) (explaining the two aims of institutional ethnography include “produc[ing] 
for people what might be called ‘maps’ of the ruling relations,” and “build[ing] knowledge 
and methods of discovering institutions and, more generally, the ruling relations of 
contemporary Western society”). 
 37. Id. at 35. See generally MARIE CAMPBELL & FRANCES GREGOR, MAPPING SOCIAL 
RELATIONS: A PRIMER IN DOING INSTITUTIONAL ETHNOGRAPHY (2004). 
 38. DAVID KENNEDY, A WORLD OF STRUGGLE: HOW POWER, LAW, AND EXPERTISE SHAPE 
GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (2016). 
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shape one’s environment—be it economic, political, legal, or physical.39  If 
savvy community organizers and development professionals map their 
worlds, then perhaps it makes sense for social scientists to adopt a similar 
method. 
Kennedy seeks to understand the projects by which people struggle and 
pursue their interests and thereby shape the institutions and rules that we 
think of as global governance.40  This leads him to focus on law, since people 
pursuing projects often treat law both as “a kind of guidebook to the global 
terrain of struggle,” and as a source of “opportunities to harness coercion to 
capture what they value as gain.”41 
Here we are interested in a different scale—that of gardens, 
neighborhoods, and cities, rather than the global—but the method is similar.  
I focus on how people mobilize law in pursuit of their farming and gardening 
projects, since that often both shapes how they see the terrain on which value 
can be created and is a way of getting other people to provide access and use 
of land and other resources.42 
Yet I also look beyond law and legal expertise to understand the other 
forms of knowledge and expertise people use to legitimize their projects and 
get others to support them.43  People may seek access to land as a source of 
value by marshaling arguments that the law affords them the right to use it 
in a certain way, but also by asserting convincingly that the plot of land could 
be used to grow some quantity of food, or as a site on which some number 
of unemployed people could be employed, or trained in job skills.  Such 
assertions may complement legal arguments by developing moral claims 
rooted in the particular expertise of the master gardener or the social 
entrepreneur.  Socio-legal mapping, then, helps us to focus on the relations—
between people, organizations, forms of expertise, even species—that enable 
(or constrain) creative, collaborative, and collective uses of land.44 
The goal is not, however, to draw a definitive and final map of a socio-
legal landscape or particular territory.  Such an effort would likely be futile, 
or at least not long-lasting, since the rules and forms of knowledge at stake 
in even a single city are constantly in flux.  Instead, the aim in bringing 
mapping to bear is to open up and destabilize preset notions of the way 
people relate to one another in the context of a given socio-legal situation, 
such as a commons.  Is an urban commons in a community garden about self-
organization—or, if we traced out the myriad relations of power and 
                                                                                                             
 39. See id. at 74. 
 40. See id. 
 41. Id. at 61, 70. 
 42. See infra Part III. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
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authority at stake in bringing about or blocking an urban garden or farm, 
might we find that there is much more in play? 
C. Property Experimentalism 
In mapping the rules, norms, and forms of authority that influence how 
people access and govern land for urban farms and gardens, I pay special 
attention to how people are experimenting with features of their socio-legal 
landscape.  At the broadest level, urban agriculture itself is an experiment to 
see how much sense it makes to have farms and gardens in the city—and if 
so, of what type, where, producing what, and benefiting whom.  As the 
assistant director of Growing Home put it to me: “we’re running an 
experiment that is testing the hypothesis that building urban farms will 
increase human capital and the financial health of Englewood.”45 
To test the effects of urban agriculture, growers first have to get land.  This 
in itself involves experiments, such as tests to see what happens when one 
makes a claim based on a certain law, or a certain form of moral reasoning.  
In effect, gardeners and farmers—and, as we will see, advocates for the 
homeless, synagogue congregants, directors of land trusts, and others46—are 
setting up what the historian of science Hans-Jorg Rheinberger conceives of 
as experimental systems.47  Such systems, Rheinberger writes, “can be 
regarded as the smallest functional units of research; they are set up in order 
to give answers to questions that we are not yet able to formulate clearly.”48  
Quoting Francois Jacob, who worked in Louis Pasteur’s lab, Rheinberger 
describes an experimental system, in a typical case, as “a machine for making 
the future.”49 
The notion here is that people who would like to intervene in a city’s 
landscape or its political economy—who would like to remake its future—
are developing experimental systems.  By doing so, they can figure out what 
happens when they make a particular claim, deploy a particular piece of 
knowledge, or argue in a new way.  They may not yet be able to clearly state 
the questions to which they are seeking answers about how the city works 
and how it might work differently.  But in making claims to land or seeking 
to change the rules and norms that shape how it is used, allocated, and owned, 
                                                                                                             
 45. Interview with Rebekah Silverman, Assistant Dir., Growing Home, in Chi., Ill. (July 
15, 2015) (on file with author). 
 46. See infra Parts II.B & III.A. 
 47. Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, Experimental Systems: Difference, Graphematicity, 
Conjecture, in INTELLECTUAL BIRDHOUSE: ARTISTIC PRACTICE AS RESEARCH 92 (Florian 
Dombois et al. eds. 2012). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 92 (quoting FRANÇOIS JACOB, THE STATUE WITHIN: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 9 
(1988)). 
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they are seeking to shape the future of that land—and by extension, a 
neighborhood and potentially even the city itself. 
This process of experimentation with property resonates with the work of 
legal scholars Michael Dorf and Charles Sabel on democratic 
experimentalism.50  Both scholars understand actors to be continually 
involved in a pragmatic process of problem-solving.51  Here, however, our 
focus is not on experiments at the level of a governance system as a whole, 
but rather in the projects of particular people and organizations.  Although 
Dorf and Sabel would hope to see agencies and firms collaborating and 
sharing information with one another,52 this is not always the case with urban 
growers engaged in property experiments.  A grower who figures out a new 
way to gain access to land may be motivated to share the outcome of the 
experiment with other growers, or may see that knowledge as proprietary, a 
means of getting out ahead of other growers. 
Finally, it is worth noting how moments of crisis might foster property 
experiments.  Property scholars Nestor Davidson and Rashmi Dyal-Chand 
have observed that social and economic crises can lay bare fundamental 
questions about the nature of ownership.53  This fits with the sociological 
intuition that institutions of commons governance might have a 
countercyclical character, with people more likely to develop them during 
economic recessions or in the wake of a natural disaster.54  Whether property 
experiments underway in urban gardens or farms result in an urban commons 
or some other form of governing shared spaces, we will see that the open 
fields and vacant lots that serve as actors’ laboratories are often the legacy 
of social and economic crises. 
II.  PROPERTY EXPERIMENTS IN CHICAGO’S GARDENS AND FARMS 
During the four years I spent talking and working with urban farmers and 
gardeners in Chicago, it was quite rare to hear them speak in terms of the 
commons.  To be sure, they and their allies in and out of city government are 
keen to devise ways for people to access and use land as a shared, productive 
resource.  But as they pursue projects to make land available for gardens and 
                                                                                                             
 50. See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic 
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 288 (1998). 
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AS PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 6 (2011) (referring to Dorf and Sabel). 
 52. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 50, at 285. 
 53. See Nestor M. Davidson & Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Property in Crisis, 78 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1607, 1608 (2010). 
 54. See Thomas K. Rudel, The Commons and Development: Unanswered Sociological 
Questions, 5 INT’L J. OF THE COMMONS 303, 314 (2011), 
http://www.thecommonsjournal.org/index.php/ijc/article/view/248 [https://perma.cc/TW43-
A84H]. 
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farms, the commons is not an everyday category of analysis or of advocacy.  
Instead, gardeners, farmers, and their allies in and out of city government are 
tinkering with a wide range of rules, norms, and forms of property: zoning, 
land trusts, landscaping regulations, even passages from the Old 
Testament.55  These are things that a hunt for the urban commons might 
overlook.  If some new form of governance is emerging as people create 
farms and gardens, then to understand how that is happening we should look 
to the concepts and tools that people actually use, rather than assuming that 
the commons is emerging through a process of self-organization. 
In this Part, I explore how we might understand the urban commons more 
realistically, as the fruit of a wide range of legal experiments that urban 
growers and their allies have pursued in efforts to expand urban farming and 
gardening.  Two sites serve as starting points for a socio-legal mapping.  
Focusing on these sites, I trace how a wide range of laws, regulations, rules, 
and norms related to property have shaped the terms by which urban 
gardeners and farmers access and use land.  The claim is not that these sites 
in Chicago represent how people everywhere cultivate spaces where people 
can use urban land as a common resource.  Instead, reading the legal and 
physical landscapes they inhabit offers a way to begin to unpack the complex 
ways in which people govern resources in places that have often been 
understood simply as the urban commons. 
A. Kumunda Community Garden 
On the east side of Kimbark Street, half a block south of 64th Street, there 
is a community garden known to its members as the Kumunda Garden.  One 
of many gardens in the Woodlawn neighborhood on Chicago’s South Side, 
Kumunda is the size of two city lots, about one-third of an acre.56  Other 
vacant lots sit to the south, offering ample sunlight for the garden plots.57  
There are about forty plots, laid out in rows, ten feet by ten feet each.  Some 
                                                                                                             
 55. See infra Parts II.A., II.B. 
 56. The 2015 map by Garden Resources of Woodlawn (GROW) identifies sixteen 
community and school gardens in the neighborhood. See Woodlawn Community and School 
Gardens, GROW (2015), http://growwoodlawn.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/GROW-
community-gardens-map-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/RSR8-EDMZ]. 
 57. Google’s street view feature provides a view of the garden and the adjoining lots. See 
Google Street View (Sept. 2015), 
https://www.google.com/maps/place/6431+S+Kimbark+Ave,+Chicago,+IL+60637/@41.77
75338,-87.5945745,3a,75y,90h,90t/data=!3m4!1e1!3m2!1sNf—y7vTIkUjmPOIL6O-
uA!2e0!4m2!3m1!1s0x880e291e7e4ee8d5:0x7601ac2fd5150304 [https://perma.cc/LFQ9-
BHGX] [hereinafter Google Street View]. 
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of the gardeners have raised their plots by ringing them with boards and 
adding compost, but many are at the same level as the garden paths.58 
The garden itself is ringed by a snow fence of wooden stakes to the south 
and along the back alley to the east and a metal chain-link fence along the 
sidewalk to the west.59  To the north, the property line is shared with a 
neighboring house and is marked off by more chain-link fencing.60  During 
the summer of 2015, a row of small kale plants lined the strip of land between 
the fence and the sidewalk on Kimbark Street, an offering to passers-by.61  
At the southeast corner, a pile of woodchips—material for keeping down 
grass along the garden paths—spilled over onto both sides of the fence, 
making it possible to step over the fence by climbing the mound.62 
I was a member of the Kumunda Garden for the 2014 and the first half of 
the 2015 growing seasons.  Tending a ten-by-ten-foot plot offered a day-to-
day sense of how such a garden operates as space shared by people who both 
live in the neighborhood and come from other parts of the city.  I observed 
how growers work together to manage the space, and to strike a balance 
between sharing their bounty and keeping it from being taken by outsiders.  
Much of this they figure out on their own, whether in person at the garden or 
via the group’s email list. 
To understand how the Kumunda Garden came about, and how it 
continues to exist, we have to look beyond just the rules of the garden and 
examine how it became possible to use this land in the first place.  That 
requires tracing how the land became available: both how the history of 
Woodlawn resulted in a large number of empty lots, and how gardeners 
negotiated to make some of those lots available for food production. 
Woodlawn today is a patchy landscape.  Three-floor brick apartment 
buildings are interspersed with vacant land.  In the fall of 2015, the City of 
Chicago owned 387 vacant lots in Woodlawn.63  This land has a history, and 
like the land used by the Kumunda Gardeners, many of the other lots that 
now sit vacant once had multi-family apartments on them. 
                                                                                                             
 58. Photos of the garden are available on a blog created by two of the gardeners. See 
Vertical Gardening, NUESTROPEQUENOJARDIN (May 13, 2014), 
https://nuestropequenojardin.wordpress.com/2014/05/ [https://perma.cc/2EA4-RB64]. 
 59. See id. 
 60. See Google Street View, supra note 57. 
 61. See Google Street View, supra note 57. 
 62. See Touch and Go, NUESTROPEQUENOJARDIN (May 28, 2014), 
https://nuestropequenojardin.wordpress.com/2014/05/28/176/ [https://perma.cc/F6HE-
MQ65]. 
 63. See City-Owned Land Inventory, CITY OF CHI. (2011), 
https://data.cityofchicago.org/Community-Economic-Development/City-Owned-Land-
Inventory/aksk-kvfp [https://perma.cc/P3AY-RMKA]. 
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Ninety years ago, Woodlawn was a neighborhood predominantly 
populated by white people.  In 1930, at the beginning of the Great 
Depression, it was home to 66,000 Chicagoans, 86% of whom were white.64  
But during the Great Depression, the white housing market slumped; black 
families from neighborhoods to the west sought to buy into the 
neighborhood.  At first, they were blocked by racially-restrictive covenants, 
which covered Woodlawn and most of the other neighborhoods that bordered 
the so-called “Black Belt” neighborhoods, where African-American families 
arriving from the South had been forced to buy or rent during the first great 
migration.65 
Both black families seeking to buy into the neighborhood and white 
families seeking to sell fought the covenants in court.  In 1940, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held in Hansberry v. Lee that minority members of a class 
action were not barred by res judicata from selling to a black family.66  
Although the ruling focused on the details of class action procedure, its effect 
was to begin to undo the system of racially restrictive covenants established 
in Woodlawn and other neighborhoods in Chicago.67 
Following World War II, the black population of Woodlawn rose quickly, 
while white families fled to the suburbs.68  By 1960, the population was 
81,000—nearly ninety percent of which was black.69  But during the late 
1960s, the neighborhood was beset by disinvestment, as white-owned 
business owners moved out, fearing a repeat of the riots that occurred in the 
black neighborhoods of Chicago’s West Side in the wake of the 1968 killing 
of Martin Luther King, Jr.70  From 1968 through 1971, some 362 abandoned 
buildings in Woodlawn were reportedly destroyed by arson;71 this came in 
the wake of a 1968 change to fire insurance regulation that encouraged 
property owners in neighborhoods with low property values to take out large 
policies on their otherwise worthless buildings.72 
                                                                                                             
 64. See Amanda Seligman, Woodlawn, ELEC. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHI. (2005), 
http://www.encyclopedia.chicagohistory.org/pages/1378.html [https://perma.cc/C2ZH-
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 65. See Allen R. Kamp, The History Behind Hansberry v. Lee, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
481, 483 (1987). 
 66. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 42, 46 (1940). 
 67. See generally Kamp, supra note 65, at 498.  For a powerful account of Chicago’s 
history of racism in housing, see Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Case for Reparations, ATLANTIC 
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 72. See BERYL SATTER, FAMILY PROPERTIES: RACE, REAL ESTATE, AND THE EXPLOITATION 
OF BLACK URBAN AMERICA 335 (2009) (quoting an observer as saying buildings “aren’t worth 
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In the 1960s, the University of Chicago, which dominates the 
neighborhood of Hyde Park just to the north of Woodlawn, worked with the 
city council to declare much of the northern section of Woodlawn blighted.  
However, community organizers with The Woodlawn Organization, a 
community association formed with the assistance of Saul Alinsky’s 
Industrial Areas Foundation, resisted these plans.73 
Since the 1960s, the population of Woodlawn has declined significantly. 
By 2010, fewer than 26,000 people lived in the neighborhood.74  This rapid 
and enduring demographic decline has reshaped the physical and social 
landscape.  In addition to the swathes of vacant lots, the neighborhood has a 
number of churches that have been left with diminished congregations, as 
those African-American families with the means to move to the suburbs left 
the neighborhood.75 
By the early 1990s some conservationists in Chicago were starting to see 
vacant lots as a potential resource. In 1998, the leading land trust for the 
Chicago region, Openlands, found that the city ranked eighteenth out of 
twenty large U.S. cities in terms of open space per capita.76  The same report 
noted that at the same time, there was an abundance of vacant lots, many of 
which were owned by the city.77  One of the recommendations flowing from 
the report was to create a land trust for community gardens, and to make sure 
neighborhood spaces were safe from development.78  In 1996, an 
intergovernmental agreement between the City of Chicago, the Cook County 
Forest Preserve, and the Chicago Park District created NeighborSpace, a new 
land trust with the mission to hold land for such gardens in the City of 
Chicago.79  The forms of land security and land tenure afforded by 
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2016] URBAN COMMONS AS PROPERTY EXPERIMENT 263 
NeighborSpace have come to be crucial to protecting land not only for 
gardens but also for farms.80 
1. Dispossession as Threat and as Opportunity 
The Kumunda Garden sits on land owned by the First Presbyterian Church 
of Chicago, not by NeighborSpace.81  Compared to many other community 
gardens, Kumunda has abundant resources, the result of its  organizers 
having seized an opportunity made possible by dispossession.  Although 
development is often understood as a threat to gardens, instances of 
dispossession can also create opportunities to both mobilize a community of 
growers, and potentially even expand garden operations elsewhere. 
Although growing only began at the Kumunda Garden in 2013, its story 
begins as early as the mid-1990s, several blocks to the north. That was when 
gardeners began digging up plots at the corner of 61st Street and Dorchester 
Avenue at what became known as the 61st Street community garden.82  This 
land was owned by the University of Chicago, which either owns or has 
informally laid claim to much of the vacant land in the northern part of 
Woodlawn in the expectation that it may be used to expand its campus in the 
future.83 
In 2009, the University had such an opportunity for expansion.  It planned 
to build a new building for the Chicago Theological Seminary at the corner 
of Dorchester and 60th Street.84  Officials from the University decided to use 
the land on which the 61st Street Community Garden sat as a staging area for 
construction, and the University’s community relations department informed 
the gardeners that they would have to leave at the end of the 2009 season. 85 
As in many other cases, gardeners organized themselves to resist 
displacement.  Since the legal right of the University to displace the 
gardeners was uncontested, the moral duty it owed to the gardeners who had 
                                                                                                             
 80. See infra Part II.B.3. 
 81. Interview with Benjamin Murphy, Coordinator, 65th & Woodlawn Cmty. Garden, in 
Chi., Ill. (June 13, 2014) (on file with author). 
 82. See The Urban Farm Project, EXPERIMENTAL STATION (2012), 
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been using the land became the issue.  In mobilizing around this issue, the 
garden benefited from the social and cultural capital of its gardeners.  Many 
of the gardeners were not long-time residents of Woodlawn, but rather 
University of Chicago students who had moved into the neighborhood. They 
understood how to negotiate with, and mobilize against, the University.86  
Among other things, they used digital video storytelling and conversations 
as a way to rhetorically claim the land, even though they only had a limited 
right to use it.87  Among the people who spoke out in favor of the garden was 
Ben Helphand, the Executive Director of NeighborSpace.88 
Ultimately, the University agreed to provide compensation to the 
displaced gardeners.89  University officials arranged with the local alderman 
to have a vacant lot at 62nd Street and Dorchester made available for 
gardening, and in the years since, this site has been converted into a 
NeighborSpace garden.  The University also agreed to donate resources both 
toward this new garden and other community gardens in Woodlawn.90 
A community garden at 65th Street and Woodlawn Avenue, which had 
been founded two years earlier, was one of the gardens that benefited from 
the University’s largess.91  Much of the support from the University was used 
to buy compost for creating new garden plots.92  In this sense, the 
dispossession from the land at 61st Street and Dorchester literally made new 
land—in the form of soil—available elsewhere in the neighborhood. 
The 65th & Woodlawn community garden was incredibly popular.  Thanks 
to the resources provided by the University, its founder arranged to not only 
bring in compost, but also have its 10’ x 10’ plots hooked up to a drip 
irrigation system.93  This drew gardeners not only from the middle class 
Hyde Park neighborhood to Woodlawn’s north, but even from 
neighborhoods on the north side of Chicago—a half hour drive, even without 
traffic.94 
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By 2012, the 65th and Woodlawn Garden had a waiting list.  In 2013, its 
founder arranged with the First Presbyterian Church to use a vacant lot on 
the block to the east, which would become the Kumunda Garden.  Again, the 
resources made available from the land deal with the University of Chicago 
helped get it going.95 
2. The Threat in the Tall Grass 
It might seem natural that a church would support community gardening, 
and First Presbyterian has made land available for various growing projects 
since at least 2000.96  But the reason why church leaders were eager to make 
land available for the Kumunda Garden might be rooted in a recent change 
to Chicago’s landscaping ordinance. 
In 2008, Chicago created a weed abatement regulation, which levies steep 
fines for any “weeds” over ten inches in length. 97  The regulation has been 
actively enforced; from 2009 to 2014, the city reportedly collected over $19 
million in fines for uncut weeds.98 
For absentee owners, or landowners without the means to keep up 
landscaping to legal requirements, the weed ordinance creates a risk.  First 
Presbyterian, a small congregation with a large inventory of vacant lots, 
faces a particularly large risk.  If church leaders see the vacant land as a type 
of investment—as the founder of the 65th Street community garden 
assumes99— then selling properties at the bottom of the market, in the wake 
of not only decades of disinvestment but also the financial crisis, does not 
make sense. 
Community gardens offer a solution to this problem.  Allowing people to 
grow a garden on a vacant lot effectively transfers the responsibility to keep 
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up the lot to gardeners, reducing the risk of fines for uncut grass.  As the 
founder of the garden pointed out to me, it also fits with the federal tax 
regulations concerning how nonprofits may rent out their surplus land or 
buildings; since the gardens are also non-profits, sharing the land with them 
does not jeopardize the Church’s tax-exempt status.100 
Yet despite the way in which the weed ordinance has incentivized sharing, 
gardeners elsewhere in the city are of mixed minds about the ordinance.  
Some have been hit repeatedly with fines, prompting Advocates for Urban 
Agriculture, one of Chicago’s food and gardening policy organizations, to 
draft a revised ordinance that would increase city inspectors’ sensitivity to 
native plants, which might grow higher than ten inches.101  Yet gardeners 
elsewhere benefit from the leverage that the strict weed ordinance has 
provided vis-à-vis landowners who might otherwise simply let their land sit 
idle.  One organizer who started a community garden in the McKinley Park 
neighborhood told me that staff for the local alderman contacted the person 
who owned an attractive piece of land and offered to waive $1500 in 
landscaping fines if the owner made the property available for use as a 
community garden.102 
3. Use It or Lose It 
With the land available from the church, the Kumunda gardeners needed 
to develop some rules.  So long as they kept the land tended, the church 
largely—but not entirely—leaves it up to them how to organize that.  As I 
found out on my first day at the garden in 2014, these rules prioritize use and 
sharing. 
In the spring of 2014, I heard from a friend in Hyde Park about the 65th 
Street and Kumunda Gardens.  I emailed Benja Murphy, the founder and 
coordinator of the garden and showed up as instructed at the Kumunda 
Garden on a cool evening in late April.  Only two plots remained, and there 
was one other potential gardener.  Benja said that I had been the first to email, 
which gave me first pick.  As we walked around, Benja told us about the two 
plots.  One, toward the back of the garden, was the site of the compost pile 
the season before.  It was overgrown, but I figured that tearing up the weeds 
and grass would reveal rich soil.  The other plot, closer to the street, had 
some concrete in it, perhaps from the foundation of a house that had been on 
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the site.  Benja was not sure about this, but assured me and the other gardener 
had the site tested for lead and other contaminants and that it had been 
cleared.  I felt a bit guilty about taking the better spot, but exercised my 
apparent right to take first pick. 
I gave Benja the use fee, $40 in cash, and signed the usage agreement. 
Benja showed us around the garden’s shared spaces.  The drip irrigation 
system was not functioning just yet; it needed some repairs.  A tool shed was 
nearly finished, built by Benja out of scrap wood and with hardware that he 
had purchased with the garden’s common fund.  He said he would stock it 
with tools—including a special wrench to open the fire hydrant, which 
provided the water for the garden— and put a combination lock on it, which 
would have the same code as the lock on the gate at the front of the garden.  
Behind the shed were a few wheelbarrows, also locked up with a 
combination lock, for which gardeners knew the code.  He also pointed out 
a strip of land just outside the fence, along the sidewalk, which was for 
planting crops that people from the community, who were not members of 
the garden, could pick and use.103 
At this first meeting, Benja told me and the other new gardener that it was 
our responsibility to get the plot planted by June 1, or we would lose both 
our fee for the year and the use of the plot.  This use-it-or-lose-it rule appears 
in the garden usage agreement.104  At the time, as an eager first-year 
gardener, it didn’t seem like that big of a deal.  The following weekend, I 
was back at the garden with a friend visiting from out of town.  We built a 
frame for a raised garden bed with some planks I had bought at Home Depot.  
The next week, I filled the frame with about a dozen wheelbarrow loads of 
rich black compost from the pile that had been dumped at the back of the 
garden. The week after that, seeds and seedlings were in the ground.  By June 
1, I had more kale and chard than I could manage to give away. 
Later in the season, I helped one of the garden coordinators repossess a 
plot that either had never been planted or had been abandoned.  It was next 
to mine, and for months I had been watching its weeds grow ever higher, 
wondering if the gardener would come back to reclaim the space.  Instead, 
one afternoon the coordinator enlisted me to help her pull out the weeds, after 
asking me whether I’d ever seen anyone there.  I hadn’t.  Before we began 
                                                                                                             
 103. See also Finding Common Ground, CHI. WKLY. 3 (May 26, 2010), 
http://www.chicagoweekly.org/2010/05/26/finding-common-ground-south-siders-share-
plots-and-plans-at-the-65th-and-woodlawn-community-garden/. 
 104. See Kumunda Garden Usage Agreement (on file with author).  The 65th and 
Woodlawn community garden has a very similar agreement, with an added option to volunteer 
to maintain a 100-square-foot section of the “free for all” garden outside that garden’s fence.  
See Usage Agreement for the 65th & Woodlawn Community Garden, 65TH  AND WOODLAWN, 
www.65thandwoodlawn.com/images/2012_usage_agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/2YKP-
GY5P]. 
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yanking weeds from the ground, we pushed them aside, searching for hints 
of food crops that might be hidden underneath.  We saw a squash vine or 
two, but nothing that suggested activity this season—the vine could have 
been from the year before.  So we pulled the weeds and planted seedlings for 
late-season crops that would go to the church food pantry. 
The following spring, the use-it-or-lose-it rule about which I had been so 
nonchalant the year before nearly came back to bite me.  My wife was back 
in town—the previous year she had been away doing her own fieldwork—
and we wanted to prepare the garden together.  Early in the spring, we 
planted some seeds in trays at our apartment, and put them next to the only 
window that received direct light.  The seedlings came up, frustratingly slow.  
We waited to plant until we could find a weekend when we both would be 
free to do so and the weather cooperated. 
Weekends came and went.  Between two busy schedules, a wet spring, 
and a lot of travel to attend to my aging father, it soon was mid-May and we 
hadn’t planted a seed.  With the rule hanging over us, we eventually rushed 
out to put some seedlings that we had bought into the ground.  Having made 
our use of our plot apparent, we planted a few remaining seedlings outside 
the fence, in the common area.  This didn’t feel like claiming land for the 
commons; if anything, we were ensuring our claim to our individual plot, to 
prevent it from reverting to the commons. 
In this and other respects, Kumunda Garden operates less like a 
community governing a commons, than a collection of individuals tending 
their own plots and doing the necessary to keep up the common areas.  One 
might think of it more like a condominium complex than a fishery.  All of 
the plots are rented to individuals, and the fence ringing the garden is meant 
to keep out non-members (even if the mounds of wood chips makes it easy 
to jump).  Although I have often heard people in the community garden 
movement decry fences and locked gates, the members of the Kumunda 
Garden receive emails reminding them to lock the gate behind them, and to 
be aware of people who jump the fence to pick free vegetables.105 
As in a condominium complex, there are shared spaces and tasks in the 
Kumunda Garden (as there are in other gardens that are set up allotment-
style).  The usage agreement provides that gardeners are responsible for 
maintaining weed-free paths, for putting compost in the right places, and for 
chipping in with work to keep common spaces well-tended.  Yet unlike the 
use-it-or-lose-it rule, it is harder to enforce cooperation by other gardeners.  
Instead, gardeners are reminded of the rules at meetings and in emails and 
are encouraged to come to community work days.  I have not heard of people 
                                                                                                             
 105. See E-mail from 65th & Woodlawn Community Garden Organizers to Kumunda 
Gardeners, (Jul. 24, 2015) (on file with author). 
2016] URBAN COMMONS AS PROPERTY EXPERIMENT 269 
having lost their plots because they free ride on the communal work of other 
gardeners. 
4. The Broader Context of Sharing 
Much of the sharing at the Kumunda Garden takes place in the context of 
resources made available or regulated by the city.  Highly active gardeners 
and their advocates often seek to influence these rules to create a context that 
facilitates community gardening, but most gardeners in the city are more 
rule-takers than rule-makers.  Water and compost provide two key examples 
of how the common governance of a community garden like Kumunda is 
possible because of rules developed at a municipal scale. 
Chicago is a temperate climate, relatively favorable for three-season food 
gardening.106  But even in such a favorable climate, weeks can pass without 
regular rain. Community gardens like Kumunda would not exist without a 
source of water for irrigation.  At Kumunda, like many other gardens in 
Chicago, water is provided from a city fire hydrant, which is fitted with a 
special adapter that connects to a garden hose.107  This runs about a hundred 
feet down the block, and can be used to replenish a bathtub-sized tank that 
gardeners use to fill watering cans, or may be connected directly to the 
garden’s drip irrigation system.108 
For gardens like Kumunda, then, the possibility of using and sharing such 
a space of production depends on the City of Chicago’s program to provide 
water from hydrants.109  Gardeners must apply to the city’s Department of 
Water Management for temporary use of a hydrant.110  As a result, the 
creation of a new community garden, or the continuing use of an ongoing 
one, effectively requires the approval of either the City of Chicago’s 
Department of Water Management or the donation of water from a neighbor.  
                                                                                                             
 106. The U.S. Department of Agriculture’s plant hardiness zone map classifies Chicago as 
Zone 6a. See USDA Plant Hardiness Zone Map, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.: AGRIC. RESEARCH 
SERV., http://planthardiness.ars.usda.gov/PHZMWeb/ [https://perma.cc/VDB8-7FTQ].  This 
allows for growing from roughly mid-March through mid-November. See Dave Donovan, 
Gardening Zone 6, LOVE TO KNOW, http://garden.lovetoknow.com/wiki/Gardening_Zone_6 
[https://perma.cc/J4ST-Y5FN]. 
 107. This setup can be seen using Google Maps’ Street View feature, in front of 6427 S. 
Kimbark Avenue.  See Google Street View (Sept. 2015), 
https://www.google.com/maps/place/6427+S+Kimbark+Ave,+Chicago,+IL+60637/@41.77
78163,-87.5945811,3a,75y,79.27h,82.55t/data=!3m4!1e1!3m2!1sSn5Axci0S-
p4HcS2kpcNyQ!2e0!4m2!3m1!1s0x880e291e80850b45:0xb36f6eb458bc3b82 
[https://perma.cc/6R5K-RA78]. 
 108. See id. 
 109. See Chicago Water Hydrant Policy, CHI. COMMUNITY GARDENERS ASS’N (April 1, 
2015), http://chicagocommunitygardens.org/resources/chicago-water-hydrant-policy/. 
 110. See id. 
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Self-organization of a garden does not simply happen, but occurs when and 
where a city official or a friendly neighbor gives it the green light. 
Providing permanent access to water is one of the major expenses that 
NeighborSpace covers for community gardens for which it holds title to the 
lands in trust.111  A connection to the municipal water system costs thousands 
of dollars, which NeighborSpace covers from its budget.112  To have such 
resources made available on a permanent basis again requires the approval 
of an alderman, since it is only at the alderman’s discretion that the city 
council will transfer land from its inventory to NeighborSpace.113 
As with water, gardens such as Kumunda could not exist without soil or 
compost.  In Chicago, as in many other post-industrial U.S. cities, 
community gardeners often assume that all soil is contaminated by lead or 
other heavy metals.114  Although people sometimes grow directly in the 
ground, experts advise reducing the risk of contamination by planting in 
raised beds with clean soil, or bringing in clean soil and compost from other 
locations.115 
Buying soil, of course, can be incredibly expensive.  This cost increases 
the attractiveness of producing one’s own soil by composting household 
organic waste.  Yet, until the City Council passed a composting ordinance in 
mid 2015, gardeners were prohibited from bringing food scraps and other 
compostable materials from their homes onto community gardens.116  At 
                                                                                                             
 111. See Chicago, USA: Community-Managed Open Space, INT’L COUNCIL FOR LOCAL 
ENVTL. INITIATIVES, ICLEI Case Study No. 61, 2 (Aug. 2001), 
https://casesimportal.newark.rutgers.edu/storage/documents/community_service/public/case
/NeighborSpace.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PSY-YRKP]. 
 112. See id. 
 113. Known as “aldermanic privilege,” this is a key part of the customary but unwritten 
power of aldermen in Chicago. See Christopher Thale, Aldermanic Privilege, ELEC. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHI. (2005), 
http://www.encyclopedia.chicagohistory.org/pages/2197.html [https://perma.cc/SP5A-
B2PE]. 
 114. See Starter Kit: Environmental Best Practices for Chicago Community Gardens, CHI. 
COMMUNITY GARDENERS ASS’N (2016), 
http://chicagocommunitygardens.org/resources/environment-and-safety/starter-kit-
environmental-best-practices-for-chicago-community-gardens/ [https://perma.cc/ZZ4S-
HXSB]. 
 115. See generally Laura Witzling, Michelle Wander & Ellen Phillips, Testing and 
Educating on Urban Soil Lead: A Case of Chicago Community Gardens, 1 J. AGRIC., FOOD 
SYS., & COMMUNITY DEV. 3 (2011). 
 116. City Council Approves Ordinance to Expand Citywide Composting Program, CITY OF 
CHI. (July 29, 2015), 
http://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/cdph/provdrs/environmental_permitsregulation/
news/2015/july/city-council-approves-ordinance-to-expand-citywide-composting-pr.html 
[https://perma.cc/9KNE-P]; see also MUN. CODE OF CHI., Chapter 7-28, Sec. 11-4-040, 
Chapter 17-9,  http://auachicago.files.wordpress.com/2015/08/chicago-compost-substitute-
ordinance.pdf [https://perma.cc/2UEC-STUG]. 
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least officially, this limited gardeners’ ability to make their own soil.  At the 
Kumunda Garden, growers received an email in early 2015 reminding them 
that this was not an option, and that the compost piles were to be used only 
for things produced in the garden.117 
The 2015 ordinance permitting community gardeners to use household 
materials for composting came in response to pressure by Advocates for 
Urban Agriculture (AUA) and the Chicago Food Policy Action Council 
(CFPAC), the two main urban agriculture advocacy organizations.118  The 
rule changes permit community gardeners and urban farmers to compost 
food scraps and organic waste collected from off-site sources and establish 
a permitting system for nonprofit organizations to start community 
composting centers.119 
5. Gleaning in the Garden 
Even if they tend crops in individual plots, members of community 
gardens generally share community spaces and many are involved in 
programs that share some of the garden’s produce.  At gardens run by the 
Peterson Garden Project on Chicago’s North Side, this takes the form of 
raised beds that are designated as part of a “Grow2Give” program in which 
five percent of garden harvests go to food pantries or nutrition programs.120  
The 65th & Woodlawn and Kumunda gardens maintain a strip of land 
between the sidewalk and the fence, with vegetables that are free for passers-
by to pick.  At these gardens, members have also developed a different way 
to share the bounty: gleaning programs that harvest and distribute a portion 
of the produce from members’ individual plots. 
The gleaning program at 65th & Woodlawn first came about as a result of 
conversations between the garden’s founder and a member of the KAM 
Isaiah Israel (KAMII) Temple in Kenwood.121  Robert Nevel, the founder of 
KAMII’s gardening programs, had ripped up some of the lawn around the 
synagogue, and replaced it with gardens where food was grown for donation 
to nearby shelters.  Having run out of space to expand around the synagogue, 
                                                                                                             
 117. E-mail from 65th & Woodlawn Cmty. Garden Organizers to Kumunda Gardeners 
(May 21, 2015) (on file with author). 
 118. A New Day for Composting in Chicago, ADVOC. FOR URB. AGRIC. (Aug. 14, 2015), 
http://auachicago.org/2015/08/14/a-new-day-for-composting-in-chicago/ 
[https://perma.cc/NW88-S5UV].  This campaign received a push from the fact that many of 
CFPAC and AUA’s leaders work with commercial farms in Chicago, which have a financial 
interest in making sure that they are permitted to bring off-site materials for composting. 
 119. See id. 
 120. Programs, PETERSON GARDEN PROJECT, 
http://salsa.petersongarden.org/p/salsa/web/common/public/content?content_item_KEY=99
57 [https://perma.cc/QEZ5-WP74]. 
 121. Interview with Benjamin Murphy, supra note 81. 
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he began thinking about ways that the congregation could help provide more 
fresh produce to local food pantries.  He proposed to the founder of the 65th 
and Woodlawn garden that they set up a gleaning program, which would 
gather produce fruits and vegetables from community gardens in the 
neighborhood.122 
The KAMII White Rock Gleaning Program took its name from the 
practice of leaving a white rock in a garden plot to signal that the gardener 
was okay with having gleaners from the congregation take some of the 
produce during their weekly gleaning visits; a gardener could alternatively 
place a survey flag in their plot to signal a decision to not participate.123  By 
the time I gleaned with the KAMII group in the fall of 2014, florescent 
orange survey flags had taken the place of white rocks, and what had begun 
as an opt-in system had become an opt-out one.  Fellow gleaners explained 
that this was because the stakes were easier to see, and because many 
gardeners did not seem to understand that they needed to put a rock or a flag 
in the plot in order to share. 
Nevel and others from KAMII cite verses from the Torah as a moral basis 
for gleaning.124  At their 2014 Food Justice weekend, annually held on Martin 
Luther King Jr. day, a youth educator from the congregation held a workshop 
on Jewish law concerning gleaning and the sharing of agricultural surpluses.  
Of particular interest was Leviticus 19:11, which instructs farmers not to 
harvest the corners of their fields.125  Nevel interprets verses such as these as 
moral justification for taking some of what other people grow.  In a talk 
before the 2014 American Community Gardening Association conference in 
Chicago, he asked whether it was chayil to harvest carrots from an 
abandoned plot, and give them to a nearby shelter.126  Property scholar 
Joseph Singer has written about his interpretation of Torah law which draws 
on the Old Testament to develop a broader argument concerning the social 
                                                                                                             
 122. Id.; Robert Nevel, President, KAM Isaiah Israel Synagogue, Address at the American 
Community Gardening Association Pre-Conference Event (Aug. 7, 2014). 
 123. See Our Garden, KAM ISAIAH ISRAEL CONGREGATION, https://kamii.org/content/our-
garden (last visited Aug. 4, 2016) 
 124. Robert Nevel, supra note 123. 
 125. KAMII members are not alone in interpreting these verses as having contemporary 
relevance concerning the duty to the poor. See, e.g., Jeffrey Spitzer, Pe’ah: The Corners of 
Our Fields, MYJEWISHLEARNING (July 24, 2003), 
http://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/peah-the-corners-of-our-fields/ 
[https://perma.cc/T47V-YQJV]. 
 126. Robert Nevel, supra note 123.  Chayil is a Hebrew word that takes on various 
meanings in Jewish texts, such as valor, bravery, and strength.  The poem Eshet Chayil, 
Proverbs 31:10–31, describes the woman of valor, who among other things plants a vineyard 
and gives generously to the poor. 
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obligations inherent in property law;127 on the South Side of Chicago, 
gardeners are doing something similar to inculcate a culture and practice of 
sharing the produce of community gardens. 
Nevel and other KAMII members have worked to spread their ideas about 
gleaning and to help other gardens develop similar policies.128  Other gardens 
have joined the KAMII gleaning program,129 and Jewish religious educators 
who attended a convention for cantors at KAMII in 2015 learned about the 
gleaning program and other ways in which congregants in Chicago were 
applying Torah teachings to guide their gardening programs.130 
The KAMII gleaning program at the 65th & Woodlawn garden also 
inspired a similar program at the Kumunda Garden.  At Kumunda, however, 
the gleaning is not coordinated by KAMII, and the produce goes to a 
different food pantry.  As a coordinator of the Kumunda Garden explained 
to me, this was because when garden organizers from 65th & Woodlawn 
asked First Presbyterian for more land for a new garden, it came on the 
condition that any food gleaned from the new garden go to the church’s own 
food pantry, rather than to other destinations.131 
During the 2014 season, these two gleaning programs ran in parallel, one 
block from each other.  I gleaned with each organization, and found that the 
KAMII program was run like a machine.  A team of a half-dozen gleaners 
swiftly moved from plot to plot and garden to garden, stopping back at the 
synagogue to weigh the gleanings for record-keeping and promotional 
purposes before distributing the vegetables to food pantries and senior 
centers in Kenwood and Woodlawn.  At Kumunda, the gleaning program 
was more bare-bones.  The garden coordinator carried over some plastic tubs 
from the church and picked vegetables with the help of a summer intern and 
sometimes a volunteer like myself. 
In both cases, however, the act of gleaning involves the application of 
expertise, and constant judgment calls.  Is this tomato ripe enough to pick? 
How many tomatoes is ten percent of the harvest from this plot?  Is this 
overgrown plot abandoned, or simply ill-tended?  If this plot is overgrown 
but has a survey flag in it, should we respect the opt-out signal?  Old 
                                                                                                             
 127. See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, THE EDGES OF THE FIELD: LESSONS ON THE OBLIGATIONS 
OF OWNERSHIP 42–56 (2000). 
 128. Nevel often shares the experience of the KAMII gleaning program at events for 
community gardeners. See, e.g., Robert Nevel, Address at AUA Spring Gathering: Sharing 
the Harvest (May 15, 2013), http://auachicago.org/2013/05/01/save-the-date-aua-spring-
gathering-on-may-15/ [https://perma.cc/7U4Y-63WX]. 
 129. One example is the community garden at 62nd Street and Dorchester Avenue in 
Woodlawn. See 62GARDEN, http://62garden.com/ (last visited Aug. 4, 2016). 
 130. Hazzan Arlyne Unger, Notes from Hazzan Arlyne Unger, 11 RUACH! NEWSLETTER OF 
BETH TIKVAH B’NAI JESHURUN 4 (June 2015). 
 131. Interview with Meg Mass, supra note 97. 
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Testament verses may help justify gleaning as an ethical practice, but they 
do not resolve the many questions of how to glean in practice.  For that, new 
gleaners such as myself would appeal to people who had more experience, 
sometimes stopping together to consider the state of a garden plot before 
taking part of its bounty, or passing it over and moving on to the next. 
*** 
New ways of governing land are emerging in Chicago’s community 
gardens, but seldom through conscious efforts to govern them as a commons.  
Instead, people tinker with ways of making land available, and regulating its 
use.  Some of the forms of regulation developed by growers, such as garden 
usage agreements and gleaning programs, are more easily conceived of in 
terms of self-organization.  But gardeners also draw on rules and norms 
available at different scales such as municipal ordinances, aldermanic 
policies, even rules from religious texts.  They experiment with these rules, 
seeing what works for gardeners, and what does not, sometimes trying to 
change higher-order rules such as composting ordinances, which would 
enable greater sharing of resources.  They also experiment with ways to 
strike a balance between exclusive use and obligation to others, giving 
gardeners the expectation that they will have most, but maybe not all, of the 
fruits of their labors. 
B. Growing Home Urban Farm 
Urban farms, like community gardens, offer sites for experimentation 
with governing urban land as a shared, productive resource.  Some social 
scientists have also suggested that they are a way to reclaim the commons.  
Geographer Nathan McClintock argues that “urban agriculture has served as 
a rallying point for radical structural critiques and the reclamation of the 
commons,”132 and has proposed that vacant (or “fallow”) public land in 
Oakland might be treated as a commons, with larger sites run by urban 
agriculture organizations as “mini-farms,” or leased directly to commercial 
urban farmers.133  Urban agriculture, McClintock argues, has become “about 
more than simply gardening,” with many growers “demanding rights-based 
changes to the food system and an increased focus on ‘entitlements, 
structural reforms to markets and property regimes, and class-based 
redistributive demands for land.’”134 
                                                                                                             
 132. McClintock, supra note 2, at 154. 
 133. McClintock & Cooper, supra note 1, at 13. 
 134. McClintock, supra note 2, at 154 (quoting Eric Holt-Giménez & Annie Shattuck, 
Food Crises, Food Regimes and Food Movements: Rumblings of Reform or Tides of 
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Walking up to Growing Home Urban Farm, in Chicago’s south-side 
Englewood neighborhood, you might not immediately recognize it as a 
structural reform to the city’s property regime.  Instead, you might first see 
other structures: hoop houses, long tube-like temporary greenhouses built 
from curved metal poles and clear plastic sheeting, sheltering trellised 
tomato vines and rows of kale.  On a summer day, you might also see a group 
of workers—many of them job trainees—weeding the rows, prepping new 
beds for planting, or cleaning harvested vegetables. 
It may not be immediately apparent how Growing Home’s founders 
experimented with property relations to develop this farm.  But it is thanks 
to their tinkering that the farm is here, on two half-acre parcels on either side 
of an abandoned railroad embankment.135  To understand whether it makes 
sense to think of Growing Home as an urban commons requires mapping 
how people brought it about, and how it has fostered new ways of governing 
the use of urban land. 
1. The Saga of Surplus Land 
Growing Home’s roots extend back to a plan to claim a prime piece of 
lakefront property in downtown Chicago.  At the end of 1988, the Chicago 
Coalition for the Homeless (CCH) received a memo from the National 
Coalition for the Homeless, explaining that a recent court order had directed 
the federal government to make unused property available for use by the 
homeless.136  A month later, an inventory of available properties arrived, 
including one listed as “Chicago Moorings.”137 
Lester Brown, a program associate with CCH, was interested in the 
leverage the McKinney Act offered.138  The Chicago Moorings property, a 
former Coast Guard facility, was a nearly ½-acre piece of prime lakefront 
property.  It was located where the Chicago River meets Lake Michigan, at 
the base of Navy Pier, which was slated to be redeveloped as a massive 
                                                                                                             
 135. Google Maps offers a view of Growing Home’s farms on either side of South Honore 
Street. See Google Maps Street View (2016),  
https://www.google.com/maps/place/5834+S+Honore+St,+Chicago,+IL+60636/@41.78750
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 137. U.S. GOV’T PROP. NOTICE OF DETERMINATION OF HOMELESS SUITABILITY, DEP’T OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. DIV. OF HEALTH FACILITIES PLANNING, (Jan. 9, 1989) (on file 
with author). 
 138. Form letter from Les Brown, Program Assoc., Chi. Coal. for the Homeless, to 
potential supporters (Apr. 1, 1992) (on file with author). 
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tourist attraction.139  The McKinney Act’s prioritization of land for use by 
organizations that serve the homeless seemed to have the potential to trump 
local regulations which might otherwise bar use of such a site.140 
Brown developed a plan for how CCH might use the property.  He 
proposed building several greenhouses on the site, in which homeless clients 
could learn job skills as they grew fresh herbs for nearby gourmet 
restaurants.141  As he noted in a letter asking for support from the Center for 
Neighborhood Technology, which had developed a greenhouse attached to 
the First Presbyterian Church in Woodlawn: “Obviously we will face great 
opposition from the City, the Park District, and the people behind the 
Lakefront Protection Ordinance.  I think, however, that the idea of a 
greenhouse and jobs for homeless people would be more difficult to oppose 
than a shelter.”142  Brown also realized that the claim to the property was 
likely to turn into a bargaining chip with the city, rather than actually turning 
into a project at the lakefront site. “Given the location and value of the 
property,” he wrote in a letter asking for support from other organizations, 
“we expect to encounter considerable opposition from a number of sources.  
However, we feel strongly that we, at least, will be in a position to leverage 
other funds and resources should we be unable to develop the proposed 
program.”143 
Exactly what might be achieved by using this leverage was an open 
question.  Brown and CCH set the experiment in motion, eager to see what 
they might get in return for their claim to the property.  As expected, the city 
resisted the land being given to CCH, and filed its own application for the 
property.144  Over the next eighteen months, the General Services Agency 
mediated negotiations between city officials and the CCH.145  Throughout, 
CCH maintained that the McKinney Act gave them a valid claim to the land, 
while city officials affirmed that a claim could not be made to land that would 
                                                                                                             
 139. See Navy Pier Re-development Planning, ROULA ARCHITECTS (1990), 
http://www.roularchitects.com/navy-pier.html [https://perma.cc/KL77-WSHD]. 
 140. A copy of a letter that the Chicago Coalition from the Homeless received argued that 
“the McKinney Act preempts state and local zoning requirements that conflict with that Act.”  
Letter from Maria Foscarinis, Nat’l Law Ctr. on Homelessness and Poverty, to Olivette 
Simmons Simpson, Dev. Officer, N.J. Hous. & Mortg. Fin. Agency (Oct. 4, 1990) (on file 
with author). 
 141. Letter from Les Brown, Chi. Coal. for the Homeless, to Lou Kreinberg, Ctr. for 
Neighborhood Tech. (Mar. 23, 1992) (on file with author). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 30. 
 144. Growing Home, Timeline: Nave Pier Moorings Site, Negotiations for Land Swap, and 
Agreement to Allow Growing Home to Sell Property (Oct. 2004) (on file with author). 
 145. Id. 
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violate local zoning and lakefront land use restrictions.146  The city proposed 
that if CCH dropped its claim to the Moorings site, it would transfer a 
different piece of city-owned land for the greenhouse project, as well as 
helping CCH apply for grants to support the program.147  CCH rejected the 
city’s initial list of alternative sites and submitted criteria that any alternative 
location would have to meet.148  CCH also tested a number of different 
proposals, including creating a line in the city budget dedicated to supporting 
the greenhouse program, an annual fee on leases at the new Navy Pier 
Development that would fund low-income housing, and assistance from the 
city in getting local restaurants to source their produce from the greenhouse 
project.149 
By the fall of 1993, the city and CCH had reached the outline of a deal: in 
exchange for CCH dropping its claim to the Chicago Moorings site, the city 
would sell it a piece of vacant city-owned land on the near southwest side 
for $10, give it priority in applying for grants, provide a no-cost lease for a 
produce stand at Navy Pier, and provide other assistance.150  The deal nearly 
stumbled over a final hurdle when the alderman for the ward in which the 
alternative property was located objected to the transfer; CCH responded by 
telling city officials they would need to have Mayor Daley prevail upon the 
alderman or CCH would move to have the federal government decide on its 
application for the Moorings site.151  Ultimately, the transfer of the land went 
through.152 
From 1996 to 2001, CCH worked on developing a greenhouse project at 
the site on Fourteenth Street.  But in the process, CCH discovered that the 
land was contaminated; the city’s due diligence prior to CCH taking 
ownership had not been sufficiently rigorous.153  At the beginning of 2001, 
                                                                                                             
 146. See Letter from Richard Wendy, Deputy Comm’r of the Dep’t of Planning and Dev., 
to John Donahue, Exec. Dir. of the Chi. Coal. for the Homeless (Sept. 3, 1992) (on file with 
author). 
 147. See id. 
 148. Letter from John Donahue, Exec. Dir. of the Chi. Coal. for the Homeless, to Richard 
Wendy, Deputy Comm’r of the Dep’t of Planning and Dev. (Oct. 14, 1992) (on file with 
author). 
 149. Letter from John Donahue, Exec. Dir. of the Chi. Coal. for the Homeless, to Earl 
Jones, Comm’r, Fed. Prop. Res. Serv. (Dec. 2, 1992) (on file with author); Letter from John 
Donahue, Exec. Dir. of the Chi. Coal. for the Homeless, to Valerie B. Jarrett, Comm’r of the 
Dep’t of Planning and Dev. (Apr. 29, 1993) (on file with author). 
 150. Letter from John Donahue, Exec. Dir. of the Chi. Coal. for the Homeless, to Valerie 
B. Jarrett, Comm’r of the Dep’t of Planning and Dev. (June 24, 1993) (on file with author). 
 151. Letter from John Donahue, Exec. Dir. of the Chi. Coal. for the Homeless, to Valerie 
B. Jarrett, Comm’r of the Dep’t of Planning and Dev. (Dec. 6, 1993) (on file with author). 
 152. See Agreement for the Sale and Redevelopment of Land (no. 96343341) (May 6, 
1996) (on file with author). 
 153. See Interview with Laura Tilly, Bd. Member, Growing Home, in Chi., Ill. (July 15, 
2015) (on file with author). 
278 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLIII 
the city said that it did not have the money to cover the costs of remediating 
the contamination, which were estimated at $150,000.154  This left CCH 
holding a liability: a contaminated parcel of land that by the terms of its 
transfer from the city could only be used for homeless services.155  CCH 
negotiated with the city for the right to sell the property, instead, and take the 
money from the sale.156  The city agreed, and after a couple years of looking, 
Growing Home was able to find a buyer who paid over $900,000 for the site 
at the end of 2004.157  Over a decade into the experiment to see what could 
be gained from the sliver on the river, this gave Growing Home, the nonprofit 
organization that CCH had spun off to run the greenhouse project, a tidy sum 
of money.  But it still had no land on which to build a farm in Chicago. 
2. Coming to Englewood 
While city officials were still willing to transfer land to Growing Home 
for the project, their attention soon turned to Englewood, where a quality-of-
life planning process was underway.158  The plan proposed to “[d]evelop an 
urban agriculture district to provide business, job training and employment 
opportunities while improving the availability of fresh produce.”159 
This was a new vision for Englewood, which as one community organizer 
put it to me, replaced Woodlawn in being perceived by city officials and 
urban planners as the most troubled neighborhood in the city and most in 
need of interventions.160  Englewood, which the media has focused on 
recently for its high crime rates and troubled schools,161 is home to 
households that are predominantly African-American and low-income.162  
According to data from the City of Chicago, between 2008 and 2012, some 
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46% of households in the Englewood community area had incomes below 
the federal poverty line, and 28% of residents over age sixteen were 
unemployed.163  From 2010–2014, 58% of children in Englewood lived in 
poverty.164 
Englewood has also been the site of incredible disinvestment and 
depopulation over the past several decades.  Once a vibrant commercial 
center, second only to the downtown Loop,165 it is now a landscape marked 
by vacant lots.  In the fall of 2015, the City owned over 1600 vacant 
properties in Englewood, totaling 153 acres or 7.7% of the total land area.166  
Several thousand more vacant lots are privately owned.167 
As in Woodlawn, this landscape is the product of successive waves of 
depopulation and disinvestment.  In 1930, Englewood was an almost entirely 
white neighborhood, home to 89,000 people.168  Thirty years later, the 
population had risen to over 97,000, but tens of thousands of white residents 
had already left; the population was now 69% African-American.169  Since 
1960, Englewood has lost over two-thirds of its population, and by 2010 it 
was home to just over 30,000 people, of whom 97% were African-
American.170 
This decades-long exodus has prompted city planners to reimagine what 
Englewood might look like, working on the assumption that the population 
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will only increase at a low rate over the next twenty-five years.171  
Reimagining possible uses for land after disinvestment has created 
opportunities for expansion and profit.  A large swath of the east side of the 
neighborhood has been leveled to make way for an expansion of the Norfolk 
Southern intermodal rail yard, which increases Chicago’s capacity to import 
goods that were manufactured overseas.172 
Meanwhile, a spur railroad line, which once served light industrial firms 
along 59th Street, sits abandoned.173  City planners have imagined building a 
fitness trail on the abandoned embankment,174 akin to the recently opened 
606 trail that links neighborhoods on Chicago’s north side.175 
In the wake of the quality of life planning process, the City transferred a 
piece of land on the north side of this railroad embankment to Growing 
Home.176  This became the Wood Street urban farm.177  Following Les 
Brown’s vision and the hopes of the community plan, the farm’s primary 
goal is to provide job training for people transitioning out of homelessness 
and incarceration.178  Growing food offers a context for training people who 
have barriers to employment in the basic skills of being a worker: how to 
arrive on time and attend to detailed (and potentially repetitive) tasks.  
Growing Home also works with partners to help its trainees seal or expunge 
their criminal records.179  In so doing, it is addressing the barriers to labor 
market entry and mobility that mass incarceration has created for residents 
of neighborhoods like Englewood.180  If land for the farm is the byproduct of 
historic disinvestment in communities like Englewood, then its labor force 
                                                                                                             
 171. See GREEN HEALTHY NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 168, at 49–51. 
 172. See generally Intermodalism – Metropolitan Chicago’s Built-In Economic 
Advantage, CHI. METRO. AGENCY FOR PLAN. (May 1, 2015), 
http://www.cmap.illinois.gov/about/updates/-
/asset_publisher/UIMfSLnFfMB6/content/intermodalism-metropolitan-chicago-s-built-in-
economic-advantage [https://perma.cc/RL2M-WFZB]. 
 173. See Hitchcock Design Group, New ERA Trail Community Vision Plan: A Path for 
Transformation, OPENLANDS (Aug. 2009), 
http://www.openlands.org/filebin/images/plans_reports/Community_Greening_Projects_Ne
w_ERA_Trail_Community_Vision_P.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7YR-YPAQ]. 
 174. See GREEN HEALTHY NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 168, at 42. 
 175. See THE 606, http://www.the606.org/ [https://perma.cc/TA7C-AYQQ]. 
 176. See Chi. City Council, Comm. on Housing and Real Estate, Approval for Negotiated 
Sale of City-Owned Property at 5814 South Wood Street and Authorization for Execution of 
Redevelopment Agreement with Growing Home, Inc., J. OF THE CHI. CITY COUNCIL 6658–88 
(Sept. 5, 2007) (on file with author). 
 177. See Our Farms, GROWING HOME, http://growinghomeinc.org/our-farms/ 
[https://perma.cc/6B7S-JPQM]. 
 178. See About Us, GROWING HOME, http://growinghomeinc.org/about-us/ 
[https://perma.cc/KUW6-WKRX]. 
 179. See id. 
 180. See, e.g., Bruce Western, The Impact of Incarceration on Wage Mobility and 
Inequality, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 526, 541 (2002). 
2016] URBAN COMMONS AS PROPERTY EXPERIMENT 281 
might be thought of as the byproduct of mass incarceration, with trainees’ 
modest stipends underwritten by grants from city and state agencies and 
charitable foundations that aim to facilitate reentry into society by formerly 
incarcerated people.181 
3. From Ownership to Trust 
After receiving the parcel on Wood Street from the city, Growing Home 
sought to put up a building on the site for its offices, processing facility, and 
classroom.182  To do so, the organization’s leaders planned to use their 
newly-owned land as collateral for a loan.183  But when lenders did their due 
diligence into the property, they found evidence of contamination.184  Once 
again, it turned out that Growing Home had failed to find that the site the 
city had sold them was polluted; this complicated the process of receiving a 
loan.185  But this time, rather than selling the property, Growing Home 
managed to get support from the city to cover the costs of remediation.186  
The loan, and the construction, went forward.187 
Growing Home’s twelve-year saga to find land on which to build a farm 
illustrates how ownership of land can be as much a curse as it is a blessing.  
Receiving city-owned properties can come cheap, but also involve taking on 
hidden liabilities.  The city has twice transferred land to Growing Home that 
turned out to be contaminated.188  This forced the farm’s leaders to either 
figure out a way to move on to another site or to find the money needed to 
clean up the contamination.  Yet, for raising money through a mortgage or 
having the ability to custom-build a permanent structure, ownership of a site 
is essential. 
When Growing Home’s staff sought to expand to a parcel across the 
embankment, on Honore Street, they decided to try something different.  
Rather than taking ownership of the land from the city, they figured out a 
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way to have the parcel transferred from the city to NeighborSpace, and then 
to lease the land from the land trust.  Up until that point, NeighborSpace had 
only held land for community gardens—holding land for a commercial, 
albeit nonprofit, farm was a new proposition.  It prompted discussions among 
the NeighborSpace board to decide whether such a land use fell within its 
mission of community-managed open space.189 
Ultimately, the board agreed that the deal could go forward without 
amending the land trust’s bylaws.  In the process, the board developed rough 
criteria for holding land for urban farms: a farm would be run by a not-for-
profit organization, it could not be an indoor farm or involve any permanent 
structures on the site (though hoop houses are permissible), and the site could 
not be too big.190  According to NeighborSpace’s Executive Director, this 
last criterion remains somewhat vague and depends on the context of a 
site.191 
City officials, of course, also had to be willing to transfer land to a trust, 
rather than directly to a farming organization.  But from their perspective, 
NeighborSpace’s ownership of the land helps solve some of the problems 
concerning site preparation, since the land trust can help coordinate and 
fundraise for environmental testing and any needed remediation.192  Since 
remediation can be a significant investment—in the range of several hundred 
thousand dollars—knowing that the land will remain in trust and be used for 
open space, even if a nonprofit is no longer able to use it, helps to secure the 
public investment in preparing the land.193 
The experiment that began at Honore Street has sparked new thinking 
about how vacant land can be governed and put to use. Other projects have 
started to follow suit.  In East Garfield Park, a low-income, predominantly 
African-American neighborhood on Chicago’s West Side, NeighborSpace 
now holds 2.6 acres of land for Chicago FarmWorks urban farm, which 
grows vegetables for sale at wholesale prices to the Greater Chicago Food 
Depository.194 
The land trust has come to be seen as a useful tool for expanding the 
commercial urban agriculture sector, by holding low-cost land for both 
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nonprofit and for-profit farms.  Foundation officials would like to see urban 
farmers move beyond nonprofit business models dependent on grants.  In 
2014, I spoke with one who was particularly excited by a Baltimore-based 
company that prepares sites and builds farms that other organizations can 
use, and by a small Chicago company that was developing a similar fee-for-
service based model.195  Recently, local foundations have created a joint 
program called “Food:Land:Opportunity,” which is funding an effort led by 
NeighborSpace to develop a land tenure model that could support for-profit 
commercial growers in Englewood.196 
This potential new role for NeighborSpace responds to a problem likely 
to arise thanks to the growth of programs focused on training new 
commercial urban farmers.  In 2013, Mayor Rahm Emanuel announced the 
Farmers for Chicago program, which committed the city to helping to find 
land for farmer trainees from organizations such as Growing Home.197  The 
Chicago Botanic Garden and Growing Power have since developed 
“incubator farms” where beginning urban farmers can refine their growing 
skills, test out their business models, and share equipment and distribution 
facilities.198  Yet when the incubation period ends for these new farmers, the 
question remains where they might go to establish their farming businesses. 
Will they be able to afford land at market rates in the city, or will they have 
to move to the country to find land?199 
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The planning process funded by Food:Land:Opportunity sought to 
develop a model for giving for-profit urban farmers access to affordable land 
in Englewood.  As of late 2015, there were many things yet to be worked 
out.  If land could be made affordable by holding it in trust and leasing to 
for-profit farmers, is that something NeighborSpace could do, without 
revising its mission?  One option that participants in the process have 
discussed is the possibility of creating a nonprofit growers’ cooperative that 
would lease land from NeighborSpace or another land trust.200  The members 
of the cooperative, in turn, could then incorporate using the business form of 
their choice, whether as non-profits or as some type of for-profit entity.201 
For some community organizers from Englewood who have been 
involved in this process, these visions are both promising and troubling.  The 
promise is clear: a new land tenure model could provide the basis for 
investments that would turn some of the neighborhood’s vacant lots into 
productive green spaces.  But as one organizer explained to me, it was 
difficult to imagine supporting a model in which a white-run organization—
such as Growing Home or NeighborSpace—would own land being farmed 
by black people; or, for that matter, a model that allowed people who were 
not from the neighborhood (or didn’t at least look like the people from the 
neighborhood) to benefit from access to low-cost farmland.202  Yet she 
acknowledged that it would also be difficult for a land trust for urban 
farmland to require that growers have a particular racial background.203 
One option would be to prioritize growers from Englewood and nearby 
neighborhoods.  The city used a somewhat similar strategy in recent 
programs that have sold city-owned vacant lots to residents for $1 each.204  
Known as the Large Lots programs, these were piloted in Englewood and 
West Woodlawn in 2014, and have since expanded to other neighborhoods 
where the city owns large numbers of vacant lots.205  To prevent outsiders 
from coming into the neighborhoods and buying up land, the Large Lots 
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programs have required prospective purchasers to own a property either 
across the street or on the same block as the vacant lot they wish to buy.206 
Applying a residency requirement for prospective urban farmers in 
Englewood, however, would be more complicated.  The neighborhood might 
not have enough residents with the specific skill set needed to run a 
successful urban farm.  An African-American community organizer who had 
tried to start a project with a white farmer in a nearby South-Side 
neighborhood explained to me that there are only a certain number of people 
in the city who have the right mix of growing and business skills.207  If 
through opportunity-hoarding,208 white people have tended to monopolize 
those skills, then using merit alone as a basis for deciding who should have 
access to farmland held in trust could create white spaces in otherwise black 
places such as Englewood.209 
Yet even with these complications, it is worth noting that Growing Home 
in particular, and urban farming more generally, has helped Chicagoans to 
imagine and act on new ways of claiming, using, and governing urban space.  
In some sense, this is as much a part of their work as growing food, or 
providing job skills training.  For example, during fundraisers and other 
events, Growing Home’s Executive Director has taken to screening a 
documentary film that features a collective farm he visited during a recent 
trip to Havana.210  The film shows Chicagoans what is possible when a city 
gives growers usufruct rights to vacant land.211  But to bring about such 
visions in the complex legal and social landscape of the South Side of 
Chicago requires figuring out who is willing to make land available for such 
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uses, by whom, and on what conditions.  That experimental process remains 
very much a work in progress. 
III.  THE URBAN COMMONS AS PROPERTY EXPERIMENT 
Mapping the socio-legal practices by which people are claiming and 
governing land for urban farms and gardens can offer a new perspective on 
how these might—or might not—be sites of commons governance in the 
city.  In reflecting on how farmers and gardeners in Chicago are 
experimenting with property rules and relations, it is worth asking again: are 
they in fact reclaiming a commons, as some scholars have suggested?  If so, 
how are they doing so?  And how do their practices compare to how scholars 
have thought of commons governance as a type of self-organized institution? 
First, it is clear that even if most gardeners and farmers are not explicitly 
reclaiming the commons, they are certainly staking claims to land, usually 
vacant lots.  It is possible to make the case that such pieces of land might, 
collectively, be understood as a sort of common pool resource.212  It is 
expensive to exclude people from a vacant lot, and particularly to do so from 
all the vacant lots in a neighborhood or a city.  And one person’s use of a 
lot—for gardening, dealing drugs, or dumping trash—reduces the area 
available to other potential users. 
At the scale of a neighborhood or a city, then, we might conceive of vacant 
lots as a common pool resource.  When gardeners and farmers make claims 
to vacant lots, then, they would be asserting that residents of a neighborhood 
could manage at least some segment of this common pool resource, in order 
to provide benefits to their community. 
The problem with this way of thinking about the governance of urban 
gardens and farms is that once benefits are established on a particular vacant 
lot, they seldom remain potentially open to all users.  Taken at the scale of a 
particular garden or farm, land appears less like a common pool resource and 
management less like commons governance.  At Kumunda Garden and 
Growing Home, land is fenced off and access is granted only to garden 
members or to people who have enrolled in a job-training program.  Only 
some residents hold rights to draw upon units of the resource. 
Nevertheless, the stories of Kumunda Garden and Growing Home help 
illustrate how gardeners and farmers go about making claims to vacant land 
as a resource that should be both used and shared.  As I have described, 
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people make such claims in a variety of ways.213  The assertion is not that 
these are typical of all community gardeners and farmers generally, even in 
Chicago. But even if they are not generalizable to all gardens everywhere, 
they provide a useful way for conceptualizing how urban gardeners and 
farmers make claims in a pragmatic way, experimenting with rules and 
norms to see what claims succeed, and which fail. 
We might think of urban growers’ property experiments as falling into 
two general categories: (1) claiming access to space, and (2) figuring out 
how to govern and use space once access is granted.  As the stories in this 
Article show, experiments with claiming space can come in many forms.  
Growers experiment with ways of getting land and other resources from 
private organizations that threaten to displace them. They tinker with ways 
to get ownership or use of city-owned land, whether for gardens or for 
commercial farms that provide community resources. 
In the course of these experiments, city officials often exercise control 
over where gardeners and farmers can access land.  As Growing Home’s 
saga illustrates, even a well-founded legal claim does not mean a gardener 
can count on access to a prime parcel of downtown land.  City officials have 
particular neighborhoods, such as Englewood, where they understand 
commercial urban agriculture to be an appropriate use of land.  And in any 
neighborhood, the alderman generally has veto power over whether a garden 
or a farm will have access to a city-owned vacant lot.214 
The city, however, is not the only player in determining access to land. 
Local foundations have also gotten involved in this process.215  Their funding 
supports the realization of city plans, such as the Green Healthy 
Neighborhoods plan, but fills in the blank spaces in those plans by helping 
to create and legitimize new models for land tenure.216  Growers who want 
access to land thus are not only making claims to the city, but also pitching 
their projects to foundation officials.217  Having gained the backing of 
foundations, they may be better able to satisfy city officials that transferring 
land into trust for for-profit urban farms will lead to use of the land and 
prevent it from returning to the city’s inventory. 
Once gardeners and farmers have secured access to land, they have to 
figure out how to govern its use.  In thinking about whether farms and 
gardens constitute the “urban commons,” the question is not whether land 
itself is a common pool resource, but rather whether what is happening is an 
example of commons governance.  Such governance is often conceived in 
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terms of self-organized or self-governed resource management—in which 
people develop rules for managing use (and preventing overuse) of resources 
without resorting to government coercion or transfers to private 
ownership.218  How well does that explain what is going on at places like the 
Kumunda Garden and Growing Home? 
At first glance, the concept of self-organized commons governance seems 
to fit these settings quite well.  Growers are indeed coming up with rules for 
managing these spaces, and they often do so on their own.  Community 
gardens such as Kumunda have rules and usage agreements their 
coordinators and their users develop, sometimes by reference to model 
garden rules,219 sometimes by looking to property rules from the Old 
Testament. 
Nonprofit urban farms such as Growing Home, for their part, develop their 
own plans for growing and allocating their yield between farm stand sales, 
deliveries to restaurants, and donations to food pantries.  When they are on 
NeighborSpace land, like Growing Home’s Honore Street farm, they must 
comply with the rules created by the land trust, such as only erecting hoop 
houses or other temporary structures.220  This rule developed as the result of 
NeighborSpace’s board tinkering with ways of interpreting their mission.  
Both it, and the rules an urban farm creates to guide its production and sales, 
might be understood as self-organization; urban farms and land trusts such 
as NeighborSpace do in some sense self-govern the resources  they manage. 
But there are also ways in which it makes less sense to think of urban 
gardens and farms as instances of self-organized commons governance.  
Gardeners, farmers, and entities like NeighborSpace govern space through 
rules and practices that are symbiotic with, and often constrained by, 
government-mandated rules.  In community gardens, for example, city 
officials hold a veto over whether a garden on city or privately-owned land 
may be transferred to NeighborSpace, whether water is made available via a 
fire hydrant, and what materials may be used for composting.  Gardener 
advocacy groups can and do renegotiate and seek to expand their control 
over management of these resources.  And their involvement in amending 
Chicago’s composting ordinance suggests that self-organization can 
sometimes lead to a change to municipal rules.  But ultimately the power to 
make, monitor, and enforce those rules rests with government officials— and 
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with neighbors of gardens and urban farms, who are perhaps most likely to 
call in complaints to the city. 
Self-organization by urban farms and by NeighborSpace is also symbiotic 
with, and ultimately subordinate to, rules enforced by municipal officials.  
Transferring city land to farms and to NeighborSpace creates secure, 
affordable land for nonprofit growers, while also helping city officials move 
vacant lots in their inventory into productive use.  This may not directly 
expand the tax base,221 but it can help remove liabilities from the city’s 
balance sheet.222  Moreover, local government officials retain a great deal of 
control over how NeighborSpace governs the allocation and use of its land.  
Much of the land trust’s board is composed of government employees, and 
the organization relies on allocations from the city, the Chicago Park District, 
and the Cook County Forest Preserve District for much of its revenue.223  
Thus even as people in Englewood work to imagine a land tenure model that 
could hold land for for-profit farms, they are doing so in the context of a land 
trust created by, and responsive to, local governments.  This complicates the 
conception of urban farms and gardens as pure spaces of self-organization or 
even spaces in which government merely plays a facilitative role. 
It is equally difficult to see apparent self-organization in urban gardens 
and farms as entirely distinct from the rules and norms central to private 
property.  We might better conceive of self-organization in gardens and 
farms as a process of tinkering with the central features of private property, 
rather than inventing new rules of community management out of whole 
cloth.  In gardens like Kumunda, for example, garden plots are leased for a 
season to individual gardeners, giving them the right to exclude others and 
benefit from the production on what is effectively their property for the 
season.  Garden coordinators experiment with the conditions that apply to 
such leases.  If you do not use your plot by a certain date, you may lose the 
right to use it and exclude others.  Or if you do not opt out of the gleaning 
program, you may have others enter your land and seize some portion of your 
produce.  If you do not chip in to plant a common garden outside the fence, 
then people may end up jumping the fence and picking from your garden.  
Rights often understood as part of the basic structure of private property—
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the right to exclude others, and to benefit from use224—remain the default 
expectations.  Garden coordinators and gleaning program leaders continue 
to tinker with ways of shifting those defaults in a direction that creates social 
obligations to the community on the part of individual gardeners. 
A similar tinkering with the bundle of rights that constitute private 
property characterizes property experimentation in the context of urban 
farms.  Vacant parcels acquired from the city come with redevelopment 
agreements that require they be used for particular purposes.  For example, 
the redevelopment agreement for Growing Home’s Wood Street farm 
required that the land be put into agricultural use by a nonprofit that provides 
job skills training.225  This suited Growing Home’s needs, of course, but at 
least in theory it also meant that if these conditions were not met, the city 
could take back ownership of the land.226  Social obligations effectively run 
with the land; to get out of them requires negotiating with the city, as when 
Growing Home found that the first piece of land it had received from the city 
was contaminated, and wanted to resell the parcel and take the proceeds. 
Farmland leased from NeighborSpace is similarly restricted.  Farmers 
must use the land for growing food, only build temporary structures, and, at 
least for the moment, be a nonprofit organization that serves some 
community purpose.227  It seems possible that a future model that holds 
farmland in trust for for-profit farmers could include some sort of residency 
requirement.  Again, although such farmland is private property, these 
experiments with how it may be governed are effectively ways of tinkering 
with the bundle of rights so as to promote the use of land as both a resource 
for commercial farmers and for their surrounding community. 
Even though urban farms and community gardens have come to be 
thought of as prototypical examples of the urban commons,228 a closer socio-
legal mapping of how people have experimented with property relations 
suggests something different than a “pure” form of commons governance.  
These are not sites where self-organization of resource management takes 
place apart from the coercive influence of government and the forms and 
norms of private property.  If we are to think of urban gardens and farms as 
“the urban commons,” it might be better to see them as an experimental form 
of governance that encourages the treatment and use of land as a shared, 
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community resource.  This involves both experimenting with rules by which 
to govern particular shared pieces of land, and tinkering with the possibilities 
made available by existing laws and features of private property.  A socio-
legal mapping of how people actually allocate and govern land for urban 
gardens and farms helps identify the wide range of rules and norms in play.  
People who seek to access and collectively govern urban land can pull upon 
everything from the rules that regulate nonprofits to zoning codes, land trusts 
to transfers of city and federal land, weed ordinances to norms of sharing. 
This web of rules both creates and limits possibilities for people in places 
like Woodlawn or Englewood hoping to rework who can use the vacant land 
in their neighborhoods.  But it also creates opportunities that people or 
organizations from the other side of the city may seek to exploit, whether as 
a place to garden, or to set up an urban farm.  This complicates the idea that 
a particular urban garden or farm is a “commons” governed and used by 
neighborhood residents.  The property experiments that take place on such a 
site may in fact make it a resource for the entire city, and contribute to the 
experience of the city itself as a commons.229  But as with other resources in 
the city, it may become a site of contention over who can access, use, and 
benefit from the resource, and whether the rules that regulate access and use 
reproduce the forms of social exclusion common to other areas of urban 
governance. 
*** 
If we understand the emergence of new forms of sharing and governing 
resources in urban farms and gardens not as the “urban commons” but rather 
as the varied products of property experimentalism, how might that affect 
visions for urban policy?  First, it would emphasize that there is not one 
single policy intervention to support peoples’ efforts to bring about commons 
governance of urban land.  People both inside and outside local government 
pursue multiple and quite diverse points of influence as they seek to bring 
about sites and systems of collective resource management.  Innovation takes 
many forms, from adapting land trust models to new contexts to imagining 
how the Old Testament could support claims to other peoples’ tomatoes. 
Socio-legal mapping, which already helps guide urban growers and their 
allies as they develop property experiments, could also be a tool for people 
who understand themselves as policymakers.  It could help identify ways in 
which a wide range of government agencies and actors—from aldermen to 
city planners to park district officials—could help foster experiments that 
promote community control and management of resources.  Following the 
path suggested by scholars of democratic experimentalism, a continual 
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process of mapping could monitor the progress of these experiments, and 
draw lessons to be applied in subsequent innovations. 
NeighborSpace offers a promising example of such an experimentalist 
process.  Having identified a problem of community-managed open space, 
local governments came together to create an entity that would provide 
people with support and space to figure out how to manage community 
gardens.230  The lessons from this work helped inspire an expansion of the 
land trust’s work into holding land for nonprofit farms, which may soon 
morph again into holding land for for-profit farms.231 
For policymakers, the question would be: “What rule best promotes 
experimentation by people who want to promote community management 
and sharing of resources?”  This could offer a new criterion for decision-
making, alongside existing criteria such as what will promote growth, quality 
of life, or an expanding tax base.  Just as those existing criteria are at times 
in alignment and other times in tension, a prioritization of property 
experimentation may sometimes align with growth or growing the tax base, 
and sometimes not. 
This perspective turns a common way of thinking about “the urban 
commons” on its head.  Often, policies promoting urban farms and gardens 
focus on protecting these sites of community resource management from 
development, a defensive struggle that pits sites understood as instances of 
the urban commons against urban growth.  An experimentalist approach 
might focus instead on identifying and creating new spaces for shared 
community governance—a proactive struggle which imagines ways in 
which sites of community resource management might encourage economic 
development, or in which forms of democratic planning help increase the 
productive and efficient use of urban land.232 
An experimentalist policy for promoting the “urban commons,” however, 
has a built-in contradiction.  As the Kumunda and Growing Home stories 
illustrate, property experiments often push the bounds of what government 
or nonprofit actors consider imaginable.  This is what the founders of 
Growing Home did when they staked a claim to land on the downtown 
lakefront and planned to build a farm for Chicago’s homeless residents.  
Federal officials were willing to entertain the experiment—the homeless 
advocates did, after all, state a plausible claim.  But city officials did not take 
a stance that promoted experimentation—at least, not when such an 
experiment was imagined as the front door of a major tourist attraction. 
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If property experiments sometimes conflict with the interests and plans of 
city officials, then a policy framework that fosters shared community use of 
resources through property experimentation might itself become the object 
of experiments.  People often conceive of the urban commons as sites that 
are community-owned and managed, but people who want to preserve such 
sites might try to secure public ownership and management.  This happened 
in Chicago in the past, when garden advocates, after the First World War, 
sought to use eminent domain to take public ownership of land on which 
people had built vacant lot gardens and war gardens.233  And it is a strategy 
that some garden advocates have lately pursued in New York City.  A policy 
that promotes experiments by residents and non-profits to bring about forms 
of shared governance that provide public goods not provided by the state 
could evolve into claims that the state itself should directly support the 
provision of those public goods.234 
CONCLUSION 
In their recent excitement to find the commons in the garden, social 
scientists and legal scholars have strived see the forest, but have at times 
missed the trees.  A desire to identify urban farms and community gardens 
as examples of the urban commons has fostered a habit of working 
downward from the master concept, rather than building up from the 
practices actually emerging on the ground.  This risks missing ways in which 
what urban farmers and gardeners are doing might actually be in tension with 
conceptions of what the commons is, and how it comes about. 
This Article has offered a glimpse of what we might see if we paid 
attention to the property practices—and the property experiments—of urban 
farmers and gardeners.  Mapping these practices suggests that at times these 
experiments may indeed produce forms of shared resource management 
similar to the types of self-organization that scholars and advocates of the 
commons would expect (and hope) to see.  At other times, urban gardens and 
farms may be governed by a mix of rules developed by growers and 
ordinances and regulations created and enforced by government officials.  
Growers’ tinkering with ways to promote use and sharing may involve 
adapting, rather than rejecting or transcending, certain basic features of 
private property—such as the right to exclusive use and enjoyment of the 
benefits of a resource.  A socio-legal mapping of these property experiments, 
                                                                                                             
 233. See BOARD OF WEST CHI. PARK COMMISSIONERS, A GREATER WEST PARK SYSTEM: 
AFTER THE PLANS OF JENS JENSEN 15 (1920). 
 234. In discussing the urban commons, Sheila Foster adopts this view of the role of 
nonprofits in providing public goods that go beyond those provided by government. See 
Foster, supra note 1, at 113–114. 
294 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLIII 
then, reveals hybridized varieties of shared property governance, rather than 
pure, unadulterated examples of the urban commons. 
Urban policymakers could benefit from a more realistic understanding of 
how urban growers use gardens and farms as sites of experimentation, not 
only with growing practices, but also with the rules, norms, and practices of 
property.  Rather than viewing the role of local government as simply 
defending space for people to grow food—or as facilitating an idealized 
notion of the urban commons—progressive urban planners and city officials 
would do well to see such gardens as sites where citizens can experiment 
with how urban resources can and should be owned and governed.  Such an 
experimentalist framework would require more patience from policymakers 
and local officials than a framework that simply defends or promotes the 
urban commons.  It might encourage claims both against the state, and to 
private property, which could seem in tension with the commons itself.  
Compared with a policy that simply encourages self-organization, or sees 
local government as a booster or protector of the urban commons, a policy 
that promotes property experimentation might bear more satisfying fruit. 
 
